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MY BRETHREN’S (GATE) KEEPER?
TESTIMONY BY U.S. JUDGES AT OTHERS’
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS:
Its Implications for Judicial Independence
and Judicial Ethics
Mary L. Clark†

ABSTRACT
This article examines the merits of federal judges testifying at others’
Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Interest in this project was prompted
by the testimony of seven of Samuel Alito’s then-current and former Third
Circuit colleagues at his hearing to be Associate Justice.
The judges’ testimony at Justice Alito’s hearing was unprecedented in
degree and kind. Because the Alito hearing testimony involved a significant
expansion in number and status of judges testifying at another’s judicial
confirmation hearing, this practice should be examined now before it can
be repeated.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Should federal judges testify at others’ Article III confirmation hearings,1
or does such testimony (whether supporting or opposing the nominee) raise
concern for the appropriate role or function for judges? More specifically,
does such testimony risk undermining the independence of the judiciary by
injecting judges into an executive and legislative branch function and by
potentially exposing individual judges and the judiciary to undue legislative
and public scrutiny? Does such testimony suggest, or actually reflect,
partiality and political activity in violation of the judges’ ethical
obligations?
Or are we (the public, interested court observers, those involved in the
three-branch system) not concerned about judges testifying at other judges’
confirmation hearings because federal judges already provide evaluations,
even recommendations, of Article III candidates behind-the-scenes (through
informal consultations with executive and legislative branch appointment
officials and confidential interviews with members of the American Bar
Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary)? Is there a
meaningful distinction between public testimony and private contact? If so,
what is it?
Is it preferable that judicial colleagues’ opinions of Article III candidates
be offered publicly at Senate confirmation hearings because of the greater
transparency of process that this forum appears to provide? Or is that
venue’s apparent transparency just that, more apparent than real? In light of
1.
This article focuses on testimony by sitting federal judges at others’ Supreme Court
confirmation hearings. First, it focuses on testimony by sitting judges, i.e., active judges or
those on senior status who continue to hear cases.
Second, this article does not address the phenomenon of judicial nominees testifying at their
own Supreme Court confirmation hearings, where federal judges nominated for elevation to the
Supreme Court, or from Associate Justice to Chief Justice, have testified on their own behalf for
decades. For a recent argument that judicial nominees should not testify at their own Senate
confirmation hearing, see generally BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING
INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES 1 (2006). Some of the arguments made by Wittes
against nominee testimony could easily be applied to nominees’ colleagues’ testimony,
including the lack of particularities that are and can be testified to with regard to actual cases
and issues likely to come before the Court for decision.
Third, the article focuses on testimony at others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings,
where different processes are used for appointing non-Article III magistrate and bankruptcy
judges, including primary reliance on sitting district and circuit court judges as judicial
selectors. These non-Article III appointments practices have been studied at length by Judith
Resnik, see, e.g., Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply,
and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 605–07 (2005), and I address them separately in an
article on judges as judicial selectors. See Mary L. Clark, Judges as Judicial Selectors: Should
Currently Serving Judges Sit on Commissions to Screen and Recommend Article III Candidates
Below the Supreme Court Level? (forthcoming).
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what many have termed the “theatrical” nature of judicial confirmation
hearings, especially at the Supreme Court level, does judges’ participation
in them risk negative effects on the public’s trust and confidence in the
judiciary? Is private contact with appointments officials and ABA
representatives preferable to public hearing testimony because the private
contact is likely more candid because it is less staged?
Should consideration of the desirability of judges testifying turn on
whether they are providing positive, negative, or neutral assessments of a
judicial nominee? Do judges lend their credibility and prestige of office to
judicial candidates by testifying at their hearings? How do judges testifying
at others’ Article III confirmation hearings compare with judges’ roles in
other judicial appointments systems, at the state, federal, national, and
international levels? Ultimately, what is the optimal role, if any, for judges
in the judicial appointments process?
It is with these questions in mind that I turn to the testimony by seven
current and former judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
at Samuel Alito’s confirmation hearing as Associate Justice in January
2006. The Third Circuit judges’ testimony was unprecedented in both
degree and kind. Though current and former federal judges have testified at
others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings off and on since 1969, only
once before Justice Alito’s hearing did a judge who was then currently
serving on the same court as the nominee testify (as in the Alito hearing),
but that involved a single judge, who did not call for his colleague’s
confirmation (as at the Alito hearing). Rather, this judge-witness explained
why the nominee’s actions in a specific case did not merit the ethics charges
lodged against him.2 Because judges’ testimony at others’ confirmation
hearings took a new turn with the Alito hearing in terms of number and
status of judges and nature of testimony, the practice should be examined
now before it can be repeated.3

2.
See infra Part II.A for a discussion of Judge Harrison Winter’s testimony at Judge
Clement Haynsworth’s confirmation hearing to be Associate Justice.
3.
Careful consideration of the desirability of judges testifying at others’ confirmation
hearings is especially important in the context of today’s Supreme Court appointments, where
ten of the last eleven Supreme Court candidates served on the court of appeals at the time of
nomination. See Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and
Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 974, 983–85 (2007) (citing Lee Epstein et al.,
The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903, 908–17 (2003)) (highlighting the new norm and the
resulting potential for creating “undesirable incentives for decisions made with an eye to
advancement”); Terri L. Peretti, Where Have All the Politicians Gone? Recruiting for the
Modern Supreme Court, 91 JUDICATURE 112, 113–20 (2007) (discussing the findings of Epstein
et al., supra).

40:1181]

MY BRETHREN’S (GATE) KEEPER?

1185

Despite active debate on the merits of the Third Circuit judges’
appearance at the time of Justice Alito’s confirmation hearing,4 surprisingly
little has been written about it since then.5 This article seeks to fill that gap.
Part II begins by charting the history of judicial testimony at others’
This “new” norm of Supreme Court appointments underscores the real potential for sitting
judges to continue to act as witnesses at one another’s Supreme Court confirmation hearings.
The nearly exclusive reliance on the federal courts of appeal as the source of Supreme Court
nominees is a departure from historic practice, where nominees had been drawn in relatively
equal number from private practice, the executive branch, state courts, and the federal bench
until twenty years ago. See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 39 (1988); see also LEE
EPSTEIN ET AL., Table 4-9: Prior Judicial Experience of the Justices, in THE SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 324–32 (3d ed., CQ Press 2003); Table
4-10: Summary of Background Characteristics of the Justices of the United States, in THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS, supra.
4.
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Should Judges Testify at a Colleague’s Senate
Confirmation Hearing? The Separation-of-Powers Concern Raised by the Alito Hearings,
FINDLAW, Jan. 16, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20060116.html (addressing the
testimony’s separation of powers implications and compliance with governing judicial conduct
code).
Several news outlets commented at the time of the Alito hearing on the unusual nature of the
Third Circuit judges’ participation. The New York Times ran an editorial the day before the
judges’ testimony, flagging concern for the judges’ injecting themselves into Supreme Court
appointments politics and for the use of the prestige of judicial office to further partisan
interests:
It is extraordinary for judges to thrust themselves into a controversial
Supreme Court nomination in this way, a move that could reasonably be
construed as a partisan gesture. The judges will be doing harm to the federal
bench . . . . Their testimony’s greatest value will almost certainly not stem
from the facts the judges provide, but from the prestige they hold as members
of the federal judiciary.
Editorial, Fairness in the Alito Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at A28. Noting that the
judges’ “planned testimony does not appear to violate judicial canons,” the Times observed that
it nonetheless “brushes up against them.” Id. The editorial concluded, “Judge Becker and his
colleagues are beginning a process of politicizing the federal judiciary that all of us will most
likely come to regret.” Id.; see also Bob Egelko, Questions Raised About Having Judges Testify,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 13, 2006, at A7; Richard Simon, 3rd Circuit Colleagues Trumpet Alito, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A-23.
5.
Two pieces published post-hearing have addressed the testimony. See Alan B.
Morrison, Judges and Politics: What to Do and Not to Do About Some Inevitable Problems, 28
JUST. SYS. J. 283, 297–99 (2007); Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of
Impropriety and the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1369–72 &
nn.146–55 (2006).
Rotunda addressed the judges’ testimony briefly, noting that the testimony had been
presented and asserting that the governing conduct code “does not prohibit this testimony by
fellow judges.” Id. at 1370. I question Rotunda’s conclusion in Part V of this article.
Morrison’s essay addressed the judges’ Alito hearing testimony at greater length than
Rotunda, though it was not principally focused on this issue. See Morrison, supra; infra Parts
IV–V for a discussion of Morrison’s essay.
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Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Part III introduces findings of
interviews with current and former Third Circuit judges on the desirability
of judges testifying at others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Part IV
explores the judicial independence implications of this testimony, noting
potential impacts on institutional comity and individual judges’ behavior.
Thereafter, Part V considers the testimony’s permissibility under the
governing judicial conduct code, noting that while some code provisions
appear to authorize or even encourage it, others arguably counsel against it.
Mindful of the views articulated by many of the judges with whom I
spoke that an appellate judge’s immediate colleagues have something
uniquely valuable to contribute to the judicial elevation process given their
close work in collaborative decision making, the article considers whether
there are other ways in the Supreme Court appointments process through
which judges could share their knowledge of and experiences with actual or
prospective candidates. Part VI explores alternative approaches to judicial
participation in the judicial appointments process, drawing on comparisons
with judicial roles in judicial selection systems at the state, federal, national,
and international levels. The article concludes by calling for an end to
public testimony by judges at others’ Article III confirmation hearings
because, on balance, the testimony’s costs outweigh its potential benefits.
II. HISTORY OF TESTIMONY BY U.S. JUDGES AT OTHERS’ SUPREME COURT
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS

A. Overview of History of Judges’ Testimony at Others’ Supreme Court
Confirmation Hearings
Current and former federal judges have testified at ten of the last
seventeen Supreme Court confirmation hearings,6 though only two involved
testimony by then-current colleagues, most recently, at Justice Alito’s
hearing and before that, at Judge Clement Haynsworth’s hearing to be
Associate Justice.7 Haynsworth’s 1969 hearing marked the first time that an
Article III judge testified at another’s Supreme Court confirmation hearing.
There, Judge Harrison Winter of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit testified about a case in which he and Chief Fourth Circuit Judge
Haynsworth had participated, for which concerns had been raised regarding
6.
Indeed, current and former judges have testified at nine of the last fourteen hearings.
7.
See infra app. A for a complete listing of testimony by current and former federal
judges at others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings.
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Haynsworth’s purchase of a stock interest in one of the parties during the
pendency of the appeal. Judge Winter’s testimony addressed the appellate
history of the case and spoke to whether Judge Haynsworth had complied
with the governing judicial conduct code.8
Since that time, current and/or former federal judges have testified at the
Supreme Court confirmation hearings of William Rehnquist to be Associate
Justice (1971) and Chief Justice (1986), Robert Bork to be Associate Justice
(1987), Anthony Kennedy to be Associate Justice (1987), David Souter to
be Associate Justice (1990), Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice
(1991), Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice (1993), John Roberts
to be Chief Justice (2005), and Samuel Alito to be Associate Justice
(2006).9
Focusing more narrowly on testimony by sitting (and not retired or
former) federal judges at others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings
(with which this article is specifically concerned), a complete listing of that
testimony is as follows:
•

Clement Haynsworth to be Associate Justice (1969) (Haynsworth
was Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit at that time):
Testimony by Judge Harrison Winter of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

•

William Rehnquist to be Associate Justice (1971) (Rehnquist was
not a judge at that time):
Testimony by Judge Walter Craig of the U.S. District Court for
Arizona in support.

•

Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice (1991) (Thomas was
then a D.C. Circuit judge):
Testimony by Judge Jack Tanner of the U.S. District Court for
Washington in support.

•

Samuel Alito to be Associate Justice (2006) (Alito was then a
Third Circuit judge):

8.
Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of S.C., to Be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. Senate,
91st Cong. 236–62 (1969) (statement of Hon. Harrison L. Winter, 4th Cir.).
9.
See infra app. A for details of this testimony.
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Testimony by five sitting (and two former) judges of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in support.
As this list reveals, two of the three pre-Alito instances of sitting judges
testifying at another’s Supreme Court confirmation hearing did not involve
judges from the nominee’s own court (Rehnquist in 1971; Thomas in 1991).
As such, these judge-witnesses did not confront the prospect of continuing
to serve with the nominee if the Senate rejected the nomination. Also of
significance, because they did not serve on the same court as the nominee,
these earlier judge-witnesses could not, and did not, testify to confidential
judicial deliberations or decision making processes.
Placing judicial testimony at Supreme Court confirmation hearings in
brief historic context, it was not until 1916 that the Senate hosted its first
public Supreme Court confirmation hearing, for Justice Louis Brandeis.
This was shortly after passage of the constitutional amendment providing
for direct election of Senators, in 1913. As John Maltese notes, “Twentiethcentury changes in the Senate made that body more accountable to the
people and led to a more visible Supreme Court confirmation process.”10
According to Maltese, “[t]hose changes made participants in the
confirmation process more responsive to public opinion, but they also
prompted participants to wage their own campaigns to mobilize public
opinion. Aware that mass sentiment could influence the Senate vote on a
Supreme Court nomination, they attempted to direct public opinion.”11
Supreme Court nominees did not testify at their own confirmation hearings
until Harlan Fiske Stone did so in 1925,12 and such testimony did not
become a regular practice until John Marshall Harlan’s hearing in 1955.13
Sandra Day O’Connor’s hearing to be Associate Justice marked the first
time a Supreme Court confirmation hearing was broadcast live, in 1981.14
Live media coverage and lengthy candidate testimony are now part of the
regular fabric of Supreme Court confirmation hearings.15 The question for
this article is whether testimony by the nominee’s judicial colleagues should
likewise become standard practice.

10.
11.

JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 116 (1995).
Id.; see also MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME
COURT NOMINEES 13–14 (2004).
12. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 19 (1997).
13. Id. at 18.
14. Id. at 9.
15. Id.
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B. Third Circuit Judges’ Testimony at Justice Alito’s Hearing
Judge Edward Becker16 introduced the Third Circuit judges’ testimony at
Justice Alito’s hearing by underscoring the relevance and importance of
judicial colleagues’ testimony:
“Sam Alito became my colleague when he joined our court in
1990. Since that time, we have sat on over a thousand cases
together, and I have therefore come to know him well as a judge
and as a human being. Many do not fully understand the intensity
of the intellectual and personal relationship among appellate
judges. We always sit together in panels of three and, in the course
of deciding and writing up cases, engage in the most rigorous
dialog with each other.” 17

Emphasizing the intensity of the judicial colleague relationship, Judge
Becker stated that he was “a good judge of the four matters that I think are
the central focus of this Committee as it decides whether to consent to this
nomination—Sam Alito’s temperament, his integrity, his intellect and his
approach to the law.”18 Judge Becker drew attention to the uniqueness of
judicial colleagues’ insights into one another’s character gained from their
participation in confidential post-argument conferences: “[T]here is an
aspect of appellate judging that no one gets to see, no one but the judges
themselves—how they behave in conference after oral argument, at which
point the case is decided, and which I submit is the most critically important
phase of the appellate judicial process.”19 Explicitly drawing on his
observations of then-Judge Alito in these confidential proceedings, Judge
Becker asserted, “In hundreds of conferences, I have never once heard Sam
raise his voice, express anger or sarcasm, or even try to proselytize. Rather,
he expresses his views in measured and tempered tones.”20
16. Judge Becker was a former chief judge and then-current senior judge of the Third
Circuit. See Tim Weiner, Edward R. Becker, 73, Judge on Federal Court of Appeals, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES,
May
20,
2006,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/20/us/20becker.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin.
He
died in May 2006. Id.
17. Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 654 (2006) [hereinafter
Alito Hearing] (statement of Judge Edward Becker).
18. Id. In articulating what he thought was the Committee’s central focus in confirmation,
Judge Becker might be understood as suggesting what he thought should be the Committee’s
central concern. Whether Becker’s weighing in on the question of what evaluation criteria
should be used presents separation of powers concerns is a question addressed in Part IV,
below.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 655.
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Judge Becker’s testimony was followed by that of four current and two
former colleagues. The four sitting judges who testified after Judge Becker
included two active judges, Anthony Scirica (Chief Judge of the Third
Circuit) and Maryanne Trump Barry (Third Circuit judge with whom Alito
had also worked at the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New
Jersey), and two senior judges, Ruggero Aldisert (former chief judge of the
Third Circuit) and Leonard I. Garth (Third Circuit judge for whom Alito
had also served as a law clerk).21 The two former judges who testified were
Timothy K. Lewis (currently serving as a partner at Schnader Harrison
Segal and Lewis in Washington, D.C.), who had served with then-Judge
Alito before resigning from the Third Circuit bench, and John Gibbons
(former chief judge of the Third Circuit, currently serving as a partner in the
Newark, New Jersey law firm of Gibbons, Del Deo et al.), whose 1990
resignation from the bench created the vacancy occupied by then-Judge
Alito at the time of his Supreme Court nomination. 22
The five active and senior judges who testified constituted one-quarter of
Alito’s then-current Third Circuit colleagues (comprising twenty active and
senior judges in all). Fifteen others did not participate, raising questions as
to why some judges, and not others, testified. It was with this and other
questions—for the merits of this type of testimony and its potential
implications for judicial independence and judicial ethics—that I sought to
interview the Third Circuit judges who had testified as well as those who
had not.
Themes addressed in the judges’ testimony included their unique insights
as judges into Alito’s judicial temperament and character through years of
shared work in confidential deliberations,23 whether Alito was a “movement
person” or “ideologue,”24 whether he approached judicial decision making
with an open mind,25 whether he was respectful of his colleagues’ differing
views,26 and whether Alito had the impartiality and integrity necessary to be
a Supreme Court justice.27
Following the panelists’ prepared statements, Senator Specter introduced
the Senate Judiciary Committee questioning of the judge-witnesses by, inter
alia, soliciting impressions of Alito formed during the judges’ confidential

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 656–57, 659, 661.
Id. at 664, 667.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 655, 682.
See generally id. at 665–67.
Id. at 655.
See generally id. at 663, 668, 682.
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post-argument conferences.28 Then-ranking minority Committee member
Senator Patrick Leahy refused to question the judge-witnesses on the
ground that, if confirmed, Alito might need to recuse himself from
considering decisions participated in by his testifying colleagues.29
Democratic Committee members Senators Richard Durbin and Russell
Feingold likewise declined to question the judge-witnesses, aligning
themselves with Leahy’s concerns.30 Prior to the judges’ testimony, Senator
Durbin had asked then-Judge Alito whether the judges’ testimony had been
his idea, or whether he had been consulted as to its merits, and Alito had
responded “no” to both inquiries.
Senator Dianne Feinstein was the only Democratic Senator to participate
in the Committee questioning. Among other issues, Feinstein inquired about
the judges’ understandings of Alito’s views of the Supreme Court’s
abortion jurisprudence, specifically whether Alito understood Roe and
Casey to be settled law or not.31 The panelists declined to respond to
Senator Feinstein’s questioning on this matter,32 with Judge Becker

28. Id. at 669. For example, Specter asked, “Judge Becker, the conference is a unique
opportunity, as has been explained, to really find out about what your colleagues think. [I]s it
your judgment that Judge Alito would allow his personal views on a matter to influence his
decisions as a Justice?” Id. Judge Becker responded, “I do not think—I am confident that he
would not.” Id.
Continuing to solicit impressions of Alito made in conference, Senator Specter asked Judge
Barry about Alito’s treatment of women’s issues: “Judge Barry, you have sat with him in these
private conferences, known him for a long time, back to the days when you were in . . . the U.S.
Attorney’s Office when he was an assistant. How would you evaluate Judge Alito on his
consideration of women’s issues?” Id. at 670. Judge Barry responded, “If I had to add anything
to my initial testimony, I would have stated more about what Sam and I did together on this
wonderful court and how reasonable he was and how he never indicated bias of any kind.” Id.
29. Id. at 675.
30. Id. at 676. One day earlier, when Alito was still a witness before the Committee,
Feingold had asked Alito whether he thought he might need to recuse himself, once on the
Supreme Court, from reviewing cases that had been decided by his soon-to-be testifying
colleagues. Id. at 773, 791. Alito stated that he could not respond at that time because he had not
previously considered the question, but would be happy to file a response with the Committee at
the hearing’s conclusion, which he did. Id.
Alito’s written response expressed concern that recusal would produce an eight-person
Court, leading to the possibility of an evenly divided vote in a case. Id. at 791. Alito then
observed: “Lack of a definitive resolution to a case when the litigants have no higher court that
could resolve their cases undermines the judicial process.” Id.; see infra notes 136–55 and
accompanying text on the recusal question.
31. Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 672–73.
32. Id. at 673. Senator Feinstein noted, “I asked Judge Alito, and I thought at the very least
he was going to agree with Justice Roberts, and he said, well, it all depends upon what settled
means. What do you make of that?” Id. Judge Barry stated, “I respectfully cannot characterize
what Judge Alito meant by that and I would much prefer not to have to try,” and Feinstein
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intervening: “I think we are here as fact witnesses more than opinion
witnesses, Senator Feinstein. I really would not answer that question.”33
Senator Specter concluded the Committee questioning by underscoring
the special perspective the judges brought to the confirmation hearing, again
referencing their participation in confidential post-argument conferences
with the nominee:
[I]t is certainly obvious that the insights which you judges have to
Judge Alito’s background are unique. When you talk about what
goes on in those conferences, you are the only ones who are there
and you have much more insight as to the opinions he has written
that you have worked with him on.34

Observing that the Committee had “30 witnesses who are coming in and
that has been a traditional part of the process,” Specter asserted that he
knew “of no situation where witnesses have more to say which is relevant
and weighty.”35 Noting, “[p]erhaps weight is the best evidentiary
characterization of what you have had to say,” Senator Specter asserted,
“[a] lot of things can be relevant, but especially where you have the issue
which has been before this Committee as to Judge Alito’s agenda or Judge
Alito’s approach or Judge Alito’s personal views dominating his judicial
determinations, this panel is right on the head.”36
In closing the session, Senator Specter addressed the precedential value
of the Third Circuit judges’ testimony: “It has been an unusual panel, but
that is really not a strike against the practice. It may be a precedent for the
future and it, I think, will be a good precedent.”37 “[W]henever you try
something new, there are differing voices,” noted Specter, “but I think it is
an extraordinary contribution which this panel has made to this process.”38
Ten senators who voted to confirm Justice Alito cited the Third Circuit
judges’ testimony as influencing their vote.39 Two senators who voted
responded, “That is fine. Anybody?” Id. Judge Becker intervened at this point, as quoted in the
text. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 680.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. These ten senators were Senators Susan Collins, Mike DeWine, Chuck Hagel, Orrin
Hatch, Trent Lott, Lisa Murkowski, Jeff Sessions, Richard Shelby, Olympia Snowe, and John
Warner. See, e.g., Sen. Collins Announces Intent to Vote in Favor of Judge Alito, U.S. FED.
NEWS, Jan. 27, 2006, available at http://collins.senate.gov (search “intent to vote for judge
Alito”) (reporting Senator Collins observing in announcing her vote to confirm Alito, “[p]erhaps
the most compelling testimony during his confirmation hearing came from seven of Judge
Alito’s colleagues on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. These judges, holding views ranging
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against Alito’s confirmation cited the judges’ testimony as a concerning
phenomenon.40 Whether the judges’ testimony was decisive of any
Senator’s vote is unknown, though unlikely, given the amount of
information available about Judge Alito at the time of his hearing.
III. INTERVIEW COMMENTS BY TESTIFYING AND NON-TESTIFYING CURRENT
AND FORMER THIRD CIRCUIT JUDGES ON THE DESIRABILITY OF JUDICIAL
TESTIMONY AT OTHERS’ SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
To learn more about what judges themselves thought of the practice of
judges testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings and why some
judges might testify and others not—specifically why some current and
former Third Circuit judges testified at Justice Alito’s hearing, while others
did not—I sought to interview Justice Alito’s then-current Third Circuit
colleagues (those who had testified as well as those who had not), along
with the two former judges who had testified.41 What follows are highlights
of the judges’ interview comments on how the testimony arose, the value of
the testimony, the likelihood of negative testimony, and the testimony’s
impact, if any, on the ABA’s role in evaluating judicial candidates. Their
comments on the testimony’s potential impacts on judicial independence
and judicial ethics are set forth in Parts IV and V below, and their
suggestions of alternative mechanisms for judicial involvement in the
judicial appointments process are included in Part VI.

across the political spectrum, have worked closely with Judge Alito during his 15 years on the
bench, and they are uniquely qualified to know how he thinks, reasons, and approaches the law.
It is significant that they were unanimous in their praise of his legal skills, his integrity, his
evenhandedness, and his dedication to precedent and the rule of law.”); see also Sen. Murkowski
Speaks in Support of Judge Alito High Court Nomination, U.S. FED. NEWS, Jan. 26, 2006.
40. These were Senate Judiciary Committee member Russell Feingold and then-Senate
Minority Leader Harry Reid. In explaining his vote, Reid noted that Alito was admired by his
colleagues (implicitly referencing the Third Circuit judges’ testimony), but that confirmation
was not a “popularity contest.” Harry Reid, U.S. Senator, U.S. Senator Harry Reid’s Remarks as
Prepared for Delivery on the Senate Floor Before the Vote on the Nomination of Judge Samuel
Alito
to
the
U.S.
Supreme
Court
(Jan.
31,
2006),
available
at
http://www.kuwaitifreedom.org/media/pdf/CQ%20Transcriptions%20January,%2031%202006.
pdf (Senator Reid’s statement announcing Alito confirmation vote).
41. See infra app. B for details of interview methodology. Where most, but not all, of the
judges with whom I spoke made their comments for attribution, I do not identify any of them by
name so as not to reveal the identities of those who did not speak for attribution. Moreover, I
refer to all of my interview subjects as “judge” so as not to identify whether a current or former
judge made the particular comment and as “he” so as not to identify the judge’s sex. I do note
whether the judges whose comments I highlight had testified or not, where that factor may well
be important in evaluating their comments.
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A. How the Alito Hearing Testimony Arose
I began by asking how the panel testimony arose. What I learned was
consistent with then-Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Arlen Specter’s
press and hearing statements concerning the testimony’s origins,42 albeit in
greater detail. My interviews revealed that Judge Becker contacted a
number of current and former Third Circuit colleagues, by telephone in
most instances, to ask whether they would consider testifying on then-Judge
Alito’s behalf. Those who agreed to testify received a formal letter of
invitation from Senator Specter as Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
One judge’s letter read:
Judge Becker has advised me of his discussions with you
concerning your testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on the nomination of Judge Samuel Alito for the Supreme Court of
the United States. The Committee and I would very much
appreciate your providing that testimony because of your unique
knowledge of Judge Alito’s work on the Third Circuit . . . .43

Not everyone who received a formal invitation to testify had spoken
with Judge Becker first. Some who were not asked to testify understood that
it was because they had had less experience working with then-Judge Alito
than had other of their colleagues who had already agreed to testify. Others
understood that they had not been asked to testify because their particular
viewpoint and/or demographic status did not need further representation on
the panel.
42. See, e.g., Media Stakeout with Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), Chairman, Senate
Judiciary Committee, After the Conclusion of the Committee’s Hearing for the Day on the
Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 11,
2006 [hereinafter Media Stakeout]; see also Charles Babington, Sitting Judges to Speak on
Alito's Behalf: No Conflict of Interest in Role, Specter Asserts, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2006, at
A05,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/01/06/AR2006010601727.html; Kathy Kiely, For Specter, Alito
Hearings Pose Internal Struggle, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-12-13-specter_x.htm?csp=N009.
According to Senator Specter’s press interview given on the eve of the judges’ testimony,
Judge Becker had been working in Senator Specter’s office on proposed asbestos legislation
when Kathy Kiely of USA Today interviewed Specter about the upcoming Alito confirmation
hearing. See Kiely, supra. While Kiely was present, Specter and Becker discussed whether
having testimony by some of Alito’s Third Circuit colleagues might be a useful addition to the
hearing. Id. It bears mention here, as it is referenced in the press coverage, that Specter and
Becker had been good friends for approximately fifty years by that time, having met as
undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania. Id.
43. Letter from Arlen Specter, U.S. Senator, to a judge agreeing to testify before the
Senate Judiciary Committee on the nomination of Judge Samuel Alito for the U.S. Supreme
Court (Dec. 20, 2005). I do not know whether other letters differ in any meaningful way from
this judge’s letter.
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Those judges who testified said they had not coordinated their testimony
in advance, i.e., that the substance of the testimony was determined by each
judge individually. Several noted, however, that Judge Becker had sought to
compose a panel that was diverse by political party of appointing president
and by ideology.
B. Value of Testimony by Judicial Colleagues at Others’ Judicial Elevation
Hearings
Many of the judges with whom I spoke (including those who testified
and a number of those who had not) stated a strong belief that testimony by
a nominee’s immediate judicial colleagues was, or was among, the most
valuable testimony that the Senate Judiciary Committee could hear, whether
in support of or opposition to a candidate. More specifically, these judges
emphasized that a nominee’s colleagues were among the best, if not the
best, witnesses on questions of the nominee’s judicial demeanor, fairness,
open-mindedness, collegiality, and approach to deciding cases (including
whether case decisions were ideologically driven or not). Underscoring the
uniqueness of appellate colleagues’ insights into a nominee, resulting from
years of working together in hearing cases, discussing cases at postargument conferences, circulating draft opinions, and interacting in other
court operations, many of the judges asserted that an inquisitorial body,
such as the Senate Judiciary Committee, should want to hear from
individuals who knew Alito as long and as well as his colleagues had, rather
than from strangers who had never met him and who had reviewed a
relatively small number of his opinions. As one testifying judge put it,
“Why would an inquisitorial body not want this data? Why ask a stranger
when you could ask those who knew him intimately? Why not go to the
best source of this information? Why have only a stranger who has read six
to eight opinions testify?” Another testifying judge applauded the judges’
testimony as a good and healthy thing, underscoring the testimony’s value
and influence by noting its significance in assuring Alito’s confirmation,
i.e., there was no question that Alito would be confirmed once the judges
had testified. In light of the perceived benefits of the testimony, one judge
who had testified expressed hope that testimony from a panel of the
nominee’s immediate judicial colleagues would become a regular part of the
Supreme Court confirmation process, and many who had testified (as well
as some who had not) stated a willingness to consider testifying at future
confirmation hearings.
One non-testifying judge observed that one’s evaluation of the
testimony’s merits might come down in large part to one’s views of the
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confirmation process itself. If, for example, one believed that Senators have
already made up their minds by the time of a nominee’s hearing and are
simply grand-standing for personal political gain, one would likely
conclude that judges’ participation in the hearing would add nothing and
could convey to the public that judges are more political than they
otherwise appear to be. If, however, this judge continued, one believed that
senators come to the confirmation hearing with open minds about a
nominee and that judicial colleagues’ testimony can helpfully address
senators’ questions about a nominee’s judicial demeanor and/or decisionmaking process, then one would likely conclude that there is a valuable role
for judges to play in testifying. One testifying judge said on this point that
the hearing process had become so partisan and defensive that, if he had
something positive to contribute to it, he would.
Another non-testifying judge stated that he would be comfortable with
judges testifying only if the confirmation process was itself non-partisan. In
a non-partisan world, this judge observed, having judges speak to what only
they can know of a nominee’s judicial demeanor, ability, “even whether the
nominee was thoughtful or rushed to judgment,” would be invaluable. After
all, this judge noted, colleagues are uniquely positioned to speak to these
qualities and address the critical question of whether the nominee has the
temperament to serve on the Supreme Court. In concluding our interview,
this judge asked, “given how partisan the hearings currently are, should
judges do this?,” and responded that it is questionable, given the
testimony’s potential impact on public trust and confidence in the judiciary
and perception of the judiciary’s partiality.
Very few of the Third Circuit judges with whom I spoke were primarily
critical of the practice of judges testifying at others’ judicial confirmation
hearings although one non-testifying judge, who was largely opposed to
judges testifying, observed that the news commentary following the judges’
appearance had sensitized the public and others to concern for the propriety
of this type of testimony, making it unlikely that it would be repeated
except in the rarest of circumstances.
C. Potential for, and Desirability of, Negative Testimony by Judicial
Colleagues
Most of the judges with whom I spoke agreed that, pragmatically
speaking, there would be a high bar to sitting judges testifying against the
elevation of a colleague from their court because, if the nomination was
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rejected, they would continue to serve together.44 One judge who had
testified, and who was supportive of judges testifying, echoed many of the
judges’ sentiments in saying that he would think “long and hard” before
testifying against a colleague. Nevertheless, he noted that he might have an
obligation to testify if he had knowledge of a nominee’s wrongdoing that
had not been brought to light through other means. One judge who had
testified did not think that there would be a higher bar to negative
testimony. This judge did not think that judicial colleagues would be
inhibited by a sense that you should not say anything if you cannot say
something positive. Even assuming a high (or higher) bar to negative
testimony, several judges who were supportive of judges testifying stated
that the disincentives to negative testimony did not undermine the value or
probity of positive testimony.
One judge who had not testified and who was more ambivalent about
judges testifying noted that negative information about a Supreme Court
candidate would likely surface through other means—whether through
testimony by other witnesses or leaks to the press—because it is likely that
whatever negative information is apparent to a judicial colleague is also
apparent to others outside of the judiciary. By contrast, a judge who had not
testified and who was supportive of judges testifying suggested that there is
a class of information known only to a nominee’s immediate colleagues that
might serve as the basis for negative testimony by judges. As an example,
this judge observed that only immediate judicial colleagues would know
whether a nominee delegated a disproportionate amount of work to his or
her law clerks. Other investigatory processes would not uncover it and other
witnesses would not be able to testify about it.
Asked about the possibility of “dueling” panels of judges from the same
court testifying about a colleague nominated for elevation to the Supreme
Court—including some panelists with positive assessments and some
panelists with negative assessments—two judges who had testified
responded that conflict is a good and healthy thing. One of these judges
noted that it would be “fine” to have this type of conflict aired at a
confirmation hearing, “just as we’ve seen it aired among academics.” The
other judge observed that appellate courts already publish majority and
dissenting opinions, thereby airing differences in public without any
44. See infra app. A. The two instances of testimony against a judicial nominee to date
involved former judges from different courts than the nominee, specifically, former Ninth
Circuit Judge Shirley Hufstedler at Judge Robert Bork’s hearing and former Sixth Circuit Judge
Nathaniel Jones at Justice John Roberts’s hearing. Id. Note that former Judge Jones framed his
testimony as raising concerns about, rather than directly opposing, Chief Justice Roberts’s
confirmation. Id.
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negative impact on the public’s perception of, and respect for, the judiciary.
By contrast, one judge who had testified expressed concern for the potential
of dueling panels of judges testifying given the lessened public perception
of dignity that might result. This judge emphasized how important
maintaining the public’s perception of the judiciary’s dignity was for
promoting respect for, and compliance with, court judgments.
D. Whether the Alito Panel Testimony Set a New Standard for Judicial
Participation in Others’ Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings
When asked whether the judges’ panel testimony set a new benchmark
for judges testifying at others’ confirmation hearings, given the number of
judges testifying at the Alito hearing,45 several judges stated that this was
unlikely. One judge who had testified responded that he thought it
“nonsense—this idea that Alito had five sitting colleagues and two former
judges, then the next guy better have nine.” After all, this judge reasoned,
the nominee does not control who or how many judges testify, but, rather,
the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee and its ranking minority
member do.46 Because it is not up to the candidate to invite witnesses, who
or how many judges testify does not reflect on the merits of the candidate.
E. Potential Impact of Judges’ Testimony on the ABA’s Role in Evaluating
Judicial Nominees
In asking about the potential impact of judicial testimony at other judges’
confirmation hearings on the ABA’s role in evaluating judicial nominees,47
I heard a variety of responses. In brief, some judges observed that the
judges’ live testimony filled a gap in the ABA’s evaluation process by

45. This point had been raised by commentator Nick Lewis in Gwen Ifill’s Washington
Week coverage of the Alito hearing testimony (Jan. 2006). Although rejected as a concern by
the judges with whom I spoke, this point was echoed by Alan Morrison when he noted a
concern that future nominees might cite the Alito precedent in asking colleagues to testify.
Morrison, supra note 5, at 297–99.
46. See id. at 297.
47. See infra notes 163–67 and accompanying text for details of the ABA’s judicial
evaluation process. In brief, the ABA’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary conducts
confidential interviews with many individuals familiar with the judicial nominee’s professional
qualifications and reputation, including dozens of sitting federal judges. Id. The information
gathered from these interviews is synthesized and reported on an anonymous basis both orally
and in writing by the ABA Standing Committee to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See ABA
STANDING COMM. ON THE FED. JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 3 (2007),
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/federal_judiciary07.pdf [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM.].
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addressing questions arising during the confirmation hearing itself.48 They
also noted that the judges’ live testimony delved into questions more deeply
than did the ABA interviews. Other judges noted that, in concentrating on
the nominee’s professional qualifications and reputation, the ABA
evaluation process had a different focus and objective than did the live
testimony. Still, another judge, who had testified, noted that one of the
advantages of live testimony was that it enabled judges to address a
nominee’s wrongdoing, if any, when the ABA process failed to uncover
such evidence.
Recounting the judges’ responses in more detail, one judge who had
testified emphasized that, if it is helpful to the Senate Judiciary
Committee’s deliberations to have the ABA present information gleaned
from its interviews with sitting judges, then it is by definition helpful for the
Senate Judiciary Committee, as an inquisitorial body, to hear the judges’
views directly. Underscoring that the Senate confirmation hearing is the
only public element of the judicial appointments process, this judge asserted
that judges’ opinions of judicial candidates should not be restricted to the
closed, confidential realm of the ABA evaluation process, but should be
heard in the open forum of the Senate confirmation hearing so that the
public can have greater knowledge of, and input into, the appointments
process.
Several judges (including those who had testified and those who had not)
responded to questions about the testimony’s potential impact on the ABA’s
role by analogizing the judges’ testimony to testifying at trial. One judge, in
addressing the comparative merits of the live hearing testimony and
confidential ABA evaluation process, stated that it is a question of whether
you think presenting a report to the decision-makers is as useful as
presenting live testimony. Echoing many of his colleagues in drawing on
the trial metaphor, this judge, who had not testified, concluded that
presenting live testimony likely has more of an impact than providing a
confidential interview because live testimony resembles putting a witness
on the stand and inviting cross-examination.
One judge, out of concern for preserving the ABA’s role, suggested an
alternative to both the judges’ live testimony and the current ABA process.
His proposal was for the ABA to conduct more searching interviews with a
nominee’s immediate judicial colleagues (if the nominee is a sitting judge)
and report its findings in more detail to the Senate than this judge believes
48. These judges did not note in their interview comments that ABA Standing Committee
representatives monitor a nominee’s confirmation hearing as the ABA representatives await
their turn to testify to determine what, if any, changes to their prepared testimony might be
needed.
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is currently done. When presenting their oral report to the Senate
committee, this judge, who had testified, noted that the ABA representatives
could seek to answer the Committee’s questions about the judges’ interview
statements in greater detail. Acknowledging that the judges’ confidential
ABA interview statements would likely lose some of their immediacy in the
Senate hearing’s question and answer format, and that there might well be
hearsay-like problems with having ABA representatives field questions
from the Senators about the judges’ interview statements, this judge
suggested that it would nevertheless be worthwhile to explore this and other
alternatives.
IV. POTENTIAL JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IMPACTS OF JUDGES TESTIFYING AT
OTHERS’ SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
One of my central concerns in undertaking this project was for potential
negative impacts on judicial independence of judges testifying at others’
Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Here, “judicial independence”
should be understood, not as a goal unto itself, but, rather, as a set of
conditions enabling judges to resist constraints on their ability to decide
cases impartially.49 Judicial independence is often conceptualized as
composed of two strands—institutional and individual.50 Institutional
independence, also called “procedural,” “administrative,” “structural,”
and/or “branch” independence, connotes the judiciary’s ability in the
aggregate to process cases and administer justice free from undue
interference by the legislative and executive branches, while individual

49. I thank Russell Wheeler of the Brookings Institution for suggesting a variation on this
definition of “judicial independence” (referencing a set of policy choices and conditions
enabling judges to resist potential constraints). See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Reconsidering
Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 9, 10 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002)
(noting, “those responsible for the formal structures of government, and for the informal norms
that fill up their interstices, do not seek whatever degree of independence they favor for the
judiciary because they believe that judicial independence is itself normatively desirable. Rather,
judicial independence is a means to an end (or, more probably, to more than one end).”); see
also KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 39 (noting, “the Founders sought to create a system in which
the independence of judges would be ensured. By providing for life tenure, they substantially
isolated federal jurists from public pressure, giving them the freedom to make unpopular
decisions.”).
50. See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 9 (2006) [hereinafter GEYH, WHEN
COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE]; see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence, in
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, supra note
49, at 160, 162–63 [hereinafter Geyh, Customary Independence].
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independence, also called “decisional” independence, refers to individual
judges’ authority to decide cases free from partiality.51
Concern for the potential for judges’ confirmation hearing testimony
enabling legislative interference in judicial decision-making was raised as
early as Justice Rehnquist’s hearing to be Chief Justice.52 There, Justice
Rehnquist “declined to talk about his own judicial opinions” on the grounds
“that any such response would smack ‘of being called to account here
before the Senate Judiciary Committee for a judicial act which I performed
as a member of the Supreme Court of the United States.’”53 Observing that
his opinions were available, explaining his reasoning, Rehnquist asserted
that “how I came to that conclusion I think is something that I think ought
not to be inquired into here.”54 Rehnquist’s concern for inappropriate Senate
inquiry into judicial decision making applies with at least as much force to
judges testifying about other judges’ decision making as it does to judges
testifying about their own.
To be sure, judicial independence concerns do not exist in a vacuum, but,
rather, operate in a dynamic relationship with those for judicial
accountability. Charles Geyh and others have written of this dynamism
between judicial independence and accountability and of shifting
understandings of judicial independence over time. Geyh uses the term
“customary independence” to connote evolving customs, conventions, or
norms that create a realm of autonomy for the judiciary. As Geyh puts it,
“[c]ustomary independence refers to the zone of independence that
Congress respects as a matter of custom when exercising its constitutional
powers over courts and judges.”55 Michael Gerhardt has in turn observed
how these evolving norms fill gaps in the “broad” constitutional framework
governing judicial appointments.56 A question for this article then is
whether customs or norms of judicial independence and accountability have
evolved to such an extent that testimony by sitting federal judges at others’
judicial confirmation hearings is now considered an acceptable or even

51. GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 50, at 9.
52. KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 27.
53. Id. (quoting Hearings on the Nomination of Justice William H. Rehnquist to Be Chief
Justice of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 220 (1986)).
54. Id.
55. Geyh, Customary Independence, supra note 50, at 160, 162.
56. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 338 (2000) (“With respect to federal appointments, the relevant
constitutional structure merely provides the broad outlines within which significant informal
arrangements or norms have developed among presidents, senators, interest groups, the media,
nominees, and others.”).
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expected part of the Supreme Court appointment process? The answer, as I
seek to demonstrate in the discussion that follows, is no.
A. The Judges’ Interview Comments on Potential Judicial Independence
Effects
When asked about the potential for judges testifying at others’ judicial
confirmation hearings to undermine judicial independence, several Third
Circuit judges with whom I spoke (including those who were supportive of
and those who were ambivalent about the testimony) responded that they
were not terribly concerned about the testimony’s potential impacts on
judicial independence because a judge could ably determine what questions
he or she would address in their testimony, and in response to Senate
questioning, and thereby minimize any potential negative effects.
One judge, who had testified, noted that he could imagine a time when
Senate questioning might be less deferential to, or respectful of, judgewitnesses than that seen at the Alito hearing. If that time were to arrive, this
judge declared that it would be totally unacceptable to have “toe-to-toe”
wrestling between the legislature and the judiciary over a nominee because
of the damage to the public’s perception of the judiciary’s dignity that
would likely result. If Senate questioning of judge-witnesses became less
respectful, this judge would “pull the plug” on judges testifying at others’
judicial confirmation hearings. Until that time, he would consider testifying
again, at least in part because he thought the judges’ testimony helped
educate the American public about the judicial process and what qualifies
someone to be a good judge.
Shifting from concern for effects on the judiciary writ large to potential
impacts on individual judges’ autonomy, I asked the judges about possible
consequences that anticipation of testimony by one or more colleagues at a
future elevation hearing might have on a judge’s conduct. The judges were
nearly unanimous in responding that no judge “worth his or her salt” would
alter his or her judicial behavior with the prospect of a future elevation
hearing in mind. When asked more specifically whether a court of appeals
judge might alter his or her behavior on the bench, or with colleagues at
post-argument conferences, or in positions taken in opinions (including
whether to write dissenting opinions) in anticipation of testimony by
colleagues at a subsequent elevation hearing, the judges again said it was
unlikely. One judge who had testified responded that, even though most, if
not all, active court of appeals judges hope, or think of, themselves as
prospective Supreme Court candidates, it is unlikely that anyone would
change his or her behavior with Supreme Court nomination in mind. After
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all, observed this judge, the court of appeals is a small universe, and it is
unlikely for judges to act that way. Another judge who had not testified said
that the possibility of Supreme Court appointment is so remote that most
court of appeals judges do not aspire to it. Therefore, the possibility of
colleagues testifying at a judge’s subsequent elevation hearing and its
potential impact on judicial behavior is a non-issue. Yet another judge noted
that judges might be tempted to modify how they framed and wrote
opinions (though not the outcomes reached) with an eye to Supreme Court
appointment, but that the potential for colleagues’ testimony would not
affect this phenomenon. Rather, this judge observed that judges known to
be on the short list for Supreme Court appointment might modify how they
wrote opinions with selection by appointment officials, and not colleagues’
possible testimony, in mind.
B. Institutional Independence Concerns
Testimony by sitting judges at others’ Article III confirmation hearings
presents concerns for the judiciary’s institutional independence as well as
for inter-branch comity and separation of powers more generally. When
judges testify about the merits of other judicial candidates, senators, both
individually and collectively, are placed in an awkward position in terms of
how best to evaluate the judges’ testimony.57 Should or could senators press
the judge-witnesses for verification, or elaboration, of the matters testified
to, as they would with other witnesses? Or would doing so trample on
judicial confidentiality? Should or could senators reject or discount the
judges’ testimony as insufficiently probative of the nominee’s fitness for
office in recognition of the incentives for positive testimony (noted in Part
III, above), or would that undermine institutional comity?58
57. See Tony Mauro, Judges Turn Witnesses for Alito: Unusual Endorsement Sparks
Worries About Politicization of Bench, Possible Recusals, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/dc/PubArticleDC.jsp?id=900005444882.
58. In addressing the judges’ Alito hearing testimony in an essay on judges and politics,
Alan Morrison raised similar questions in depicting Senators’ responses to a hypothetical judge
testifying at a colleague’s elevation hearing. See Morrison, supra note 5, at 297–98. Morrison
wrote:
After hearing favorable testimony, none of which is likely to be very specific,
a senator would ask a question such as, “Judge, can you give us an example
of a case that illustrates the proposition that the nominee is open-minded and
changes his views when presented with strong contrary arguments?”
Id. Morrison noted, “[t]he judge surely would, and should, refuse to supply such specifics, if
there are any, because to do so would violate the sanctity of the judges’ conference.” Id. at 298.
Morrison continued: “If such a scenario took place in a courtroom, with an ordinary witness, the
witness could not refuse to answer, or if he did, his prior testimony would be stricken,” and
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Beyond the awkwardness that such testimony presents for Senators,
testimony by judges at others’ Article III confirmation hearings has the
potential to present separation of powers problems by involving individual
judges and the judiciary in assisting Senators and the Senate in evaluating
judicial candidates.59 Problems may arise if the judge-witnesses comment
on individual case decisions or types of decisions by a candidate and
thereby assist the Senate in evaluating the candidate’s decision-making
process, where it is the Senate’s, and not the judiciary’s, responsibility to
evaluate the nominee’s qualifications for office. Judicial testimony may also
jeopardize the separation of powers by involving judges in weighing in on
inherently political questions of how best to evaluate judicial nominees,
e.g., what criteria to apply, including whether a nominee’s ideology should
be considered.60 These are questions committed to the executive and
legislative branches.61 Moreover, judicial testimony at others’ confirmation
hearings runs the risk of exposing to Senate (and public) scrutiny what
should properly be confidential judicial branch operations. Many of these
concerns would become even more pressing if Senate questioning of judgewitnesses became more challenging and less respectful than that seen to
date.
Of course, judges already interact with Congress, including through the
presentation of testimony,62 and separation of powers principles do not
dictate that the branches cannot interact. Indeed, the governing code of
asked, “[w]hat would happen in the Senate? Would the committee, and the remaining senators
who were not on the committee, be instructed to disregard the testimony of the judges, or would
the judges be compelled to violate their rules of confidentiality?” Id. “Either way,” Morrison
concluded, “the situation would be quite awkward, with the need for information to test the
statements made in support of the nominee on one side and the need to guard the confidentiality
of communications between judges regarding their cases on the other.” Id.
59. See Mauro, supra note 57, at 13.
60. Dorf, supra note 4.
61. See, e.g., id. This formulation of the issue begs the question whether judges
inappropriately weigh in on political questions if invited to do so by a Senate committee, as in
the Alito hearing. See Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 654–81. In other words, has any branch
trampled on any other branch’s domain under these circumstances? The judges were invited,
and they welcomed the invitation. Thus, it could be argued that the invitation to testify, and the
resulting testimony, reflect cooperation, not interference.
62. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the
Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1172 n.20 (1996) (citing
Maeva Marcus & Emily Field Van Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the New Federal System,
1789–1800, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 31, 36–42 (Robert
A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (discussing interaction between judges, Congress, and the president in
the 1790s)); Harvey Rishikof & Barbara A. Perry, “Separateness but Interdependence,
Autonomy but Reciprocity”: A First Look at Federal Judges’ Appearances Before Legislative
Committees, 46 MERCER L. REV. 667, 671, 679–80 (1995) (compiling and classifying
congressional testimony by sitting judges).
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conduct authorizes judicial testimony about matters of judicial expertise,
including judicial administration,63 and court-Congress interactions have
been encouraged by judges, legislators, and academic commentators as a
healthy and productive enterprise, leading to greater mutual understanding
and improved efficacy of each branch.64 Thus, the question is not whether
there will, or should, be court-Congress interaction, but, rather, as Geyh and
Katzmann and others frame it, what parameters should govern such
interactions.65
Aside from the confirmation hearing testimony noted in Part II and
Appendix A, judges’ congressional testimony to date has focused on the
judiciary’s budget, number of judgeships and their allocation, revisions to
civil and criminal procedural rules, and enactment of, or amendments to,
substantive law. While all of these matters of judicial testimony can be
contentious, they are different in kind from judges weighing in on the merits
of individual judicial appointments. As Terri Peretti and others have
observed, the judicial appointment process is overtly political, and indeed,
overtly partisan:
Although some may find it abhorrent, the process by which federal
judges, especially Supreme Court justices, are recruited and
selected is highly political. Judges are not recruited and chosen
through a civil service system emphasizing merit, as in some
European legal systems, but through a political process controlled
by politicians and emphasizing partisanship and ideology.66

Because the judicial appointment process is inherently political (with
executive and legislative powers intentionally at play)67 and overtly
partisan, and because the Constitution specifically reserves the judicial
appointment power to the executive and legislative branches,68 it is
especially concerning from an institutional well-being and inter-branch
63. See discussion infra Part V.
64. See generally KATZMANN, supra note 12 (proposing, as appropriate, greater interaction
between courts and Congress, for example, judicial notification to Congress of statutory errors
or omissions).
65. Geyh, supra note 62, at 1239 (Geyh cautions that “the problem for the future is not
that judges will fail to communicate with Congress. The problem is that they may communicate
too much or in such a way as to appear self-interested to a Congress and public predisposed to
second-guess the motives of government officials in the aftermath of Watergate . . . .”); see
generally KATZMANN, supra note 12.
66. TERRI J. PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 85 (1999).
67. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (stating that the President shall appoint judges with
advice and consent of Senate); see also WITTES, supra note 1, at 130 (observing that “the
Framers of the Constitution designed a system that involved the two political branches of
government”).
68. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 3, at 974.
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comity perspective that sitting judges are injected, and/or are injecting
themselves, into the heat of the confirmation process. While the judicial
conduct code authorizes judges to “participate in the process of judicial
selection by . . . responding to official inquiries concerning a person being
considered for a judgeship,”69 judicial testimony at others’ Article III
confirmation hearings goes beyond merely responding to inquiries when it
takes positions in favor of or against nominees. Judges should not pass
judgment on judicial nominees because this is a function reserved for the
executive and legislative branches. Rather, judges should desist from
testifying to safeguard the well-being of the courts and the three-branch
system.
C. Individual Independence Concerns
In addition to the testimony’s implications for institutional independence
and inter-branch comity lie possible threats to individual judges’ autonomy.
Here, the principal concern is for the extent to which individual judicial
behavior may be adversely affected by a judge’s awareness that his or her
current (and former) judicial colleagues may volunteer, or be called on, to
testify if the judge is nominated for elevation to a higher court. Will the job
performance or manner of judges contemplating elevation be affected by a
desire to gain colleagues’ favorable reviews, or avoid colleagues’ criticism
(whether consciously or not)? Does an apparent need for circumspection
already exist for those aspiring to higher judgeships, irrespective of the
potential for public testimony by fellow judges, where judges already talk
with executive and legislative branch officials and ABA representatives
about the merits of individual nominees?70 Put more directly, are judges
with aspirations for higher office, and/or those known to be on the short list
for the Supreme Court, already aware of the need to be circumspect around
their colleagues out of concern that things they say or do may be divulged
privately, such that the possibility of, indeed, the perceived need for, public
testimony by judicial colleagues does nothing to alter this reality? Does the
public nature of confirmation hearing testimony render it sufficiently
different in kind that it has a more powerful, and more damaging, effect on
individual judicial autonomy? This is a question for further empirical
research. Among the questions framed by the potential impact of public
testimony on individual judicial behavior are: for the prevalence of judicial
69. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2B cmt. (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29,
2008); see infra Part V.B.
70. See discussion infra Part VI.
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ambition,71 for the degree to which judges are affected by awareness of
fellow judges’ opinions of them,72 and for the importance of the forum in
which colleagues’ opinions might be expressed, whether public or private.
What we do know is that where a judge’s confirmation hearing
constitutes the point in time when he or she is most vulnerable to Senate
scrutiny and least independent,73 testimony by other judges implicates the
judiciary, both individually and collectively, in a lessened observation of
judicial autonomy, with individual as well as institutional ramifications.
V. THE TESTIMONY’S PERMISSIBILITY UNDER THE GOVERNING JUDICIAL
CONDUCT CODE
Concern for the conduct code permissibility of judges’ testimony at
others’ judicial confirmation hearings had been raised by Senate committee
members as early as Rehnquist’s confirmation hearing to be Associate
Justice. At that time, Senator Birch Bayh flagged concern for the ethical
propriety of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s seeking Judge Craig’s
opinion of Rehnquist: “[T]his morning I had said to my staff I would really
like to talk to Walter Craig, but I didn’t think it was ethical for me to
approach him because he now sits as a distinguished member of the Federal
71. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 57 (1997); see also
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 81
(2006). Baum has considered this question of judicial ambition and its impact on judicial
decision-making at some length. See id. Noting, “[t]he federal courts provide a good setting in
which to consider ambition for judicial promotions,” Baum writes, “[p]resumably, the great
majority of judges would happily accept a promotion: ‘Every magistrate judge is a district judge
in waiting; every district judge is a circuit judge in waiting; every circuit judge is an associate
justice in waiting.’” Id. (citations omitted). According to Baum, “one federal judge said about
those who want promotions: ‘they know their votes are being watched, their decisions are being
analyzed.’ Thus ambitious judges [in the federal system] have reason to think about the
relationship between their choices in cases and their prospects for promotions.” Id. (citation
omitted). Of course, this might be all the more true if judges anticipate colleagues testifying
about them at subsequent confirmation hearings.
72. This second question has been insufficiently studied to date, though a burgeoning
literature on intra-panel decision making and factors that affect appellate judicial outcomes is
developing. See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT:
INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING (Greg Ivers & Kevin T. McGuire eds.,
2006).
73. According to Geyh, Congress has “experimented with a variety of means to control
court decision making, eventually jettisoning them as antithetical to judicial independence.”
GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 50, at 11. Geyh observes, “the
appointments process—which had always been highly politicized and comparatively
unrestrained—emerged as the one remaining viable mechanism that would allow Congress to
influence judicial decision making.” Id. Thus, judicial appointments became “the battlefield of
choice for [congressional] control of the courts.” Id.
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judiciary in Arizona.”74 Several senators likewise raised concern for the
ethical propriety of sitting judges testifying in support of judicial nominees
at Judge Bork’s 1987 hearing to be Associate Justice.75
As for whether the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges76 permits judges’
testimony at others’ judicial confirmation hearings, the answer is far from
clear. While some Code provisions appear to allow, if not encourage, this
testimony, others arguably counsel against it.77 What is clear is that the
74. See generally Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 180 (1971).
75. During former Chief Justice Warren Burger’s testimony in support of Bork’s
confirmation, Senator Dennis DeConcini solicited Burger’s thoughts on the ethics of judges
addressing the merits of individual judicial appointments, asking, “[d]o you feel that it is proper
for a judge to make public statements or if not, is there a proper way for them to express their
views?” Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 2108 (1987). When
Burger replied that each judge must decide for him or herself, DeConcini asked whether there
were any guidelines or standards governing judges’ testimony about other judicial nominees. Id.
Without referencing relevant judicial conduct codes, Burger replied, “I think it is up to each
judge, Senator.” Id.
Senator Hubert Humphrey also questioned Burger on the ethics of judges testifying at
others’ judicial confirmation hearings, observing, “I find it remarkable that a retired Chief
Justice would even involve himself in such a controversy. I do not know if there is precedent for
that, but it is certainly a remarkable thing.” Id. at 2114. Burger interjected, “I do not feel as
though I am involved in a controversy, Senator, if I may interrupt you. I feel I am simply
expressing views as a citizen. Now if that draws me into a controversy, so be it.” Id.
76. The Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges was adopted in 1973 by the Judicial Conference
of the United States, the federal judiciary’s standards and policy-setting body. See 69 F.R.D.
273 (1973). The Judicial Conference proposed a revised code on February 29, 2008, for which
the comment period has closed. Though the newly revised code has not been finally adopted, I
cite to its revised language and numbering in this Part.
The Code of Conduct is considered “the law with respect to the ethical obligations of federal
judges,” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and governs all
Article III judges below the Supreme Court level. See generally JAMES ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND ETHICS (4th ed. 2007). Compliance with the judicial conduct code is evaluated
according to a reasonable person standard and consistent with applicable federal law. Id. The
official Commentary to Canon 1 instructs, “[t]he Canons are rules of reason. They should be
applied consistent with constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules, and decisional
law, and in the context of all relevant circumstances.” CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES
Canon 1 cmt. (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29, 2008); see generally Leslie W. Abramson,
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 949, 953–57 (1996).
77. See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 87 (observing that “[a]ny review of [the
Conduct Code’s] provisions . . . highlights its limited utility in the context of judicial-legislative
relations”). Katzmann continued:
They [the conduct code provisions] do not expressly deal with judicial
interaction with Congress, with the full range of circumstances in which
judges and legislators interact, directly and indirectly. The canons do not
consider how such variables as substance and form, conjoining in a
multiplicity of ways, affect the propriety of communication.
Id. at 89.
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Code applies only to sitting judges, including active and senior judges, and
not to those who have resigned from the bench. Thus, the Code analysis set
forth in Parts B and C below applies to some but not all of the judges who
have testified at others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings to date.78
A. The Judges’ Interview Comments on the Testimony’s Permissibility
Under the Governing Conduct Code
In speaking with the judges about the permissibility of judges’
confirmation hearing testimony, I was interested, first, in verifying Senator
Specter’s statement to the press at the time of the Alito hearing that Judge
Becker and his colleagues had consulted, prior to agreeing to appear before
the Committee, on the conduct code permissibility of judges testifying at
others’ confirmation hearings.79 The interviews made clear that Judge
Becker had engaged in an ethics consultation before the panel testimony
was presented and had been assured that the testimony was permissible
under the governing code.80

78. The conduct code does not apply to any of the former judges who have testified at
others’ judicial confirmation hearings, including former Judges Gibbons and Lewis at Justice
Alito’s hearing. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES cmt. Compliance with the Code of
Conduct (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29, 2008).
79. Media Stakeout, supra note 42, at 2 (reporting that, when asked whether there was
“ever any question as to whether [the Third Circuit judges’] testimony met their canon of
ethics?,” Specter responded, “[n]o, I don't think so . . . . Judge Becker first thought about
testifying as character witnesses in criminal trials, and analogized it. And even there they can
testify if they're -- so long as they're not volunteers, if they're subpoenaed. So -- and then, when
there was research further -- and these judges are very careful people and they know their
canons, and I know that they went into it in meticulous, scrupulous detail to make a
determination as to the propriety of what they're doing.”).
80. I do not know whether Judge Becker sought an official advisory opinion on the
propriety of the testimony from the Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct. The
Judicial Conference began issuing advisory opinions on questions of judicial ethics in 1970. See
Andrew Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code: The Parting
of the Ways, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 276 (2007). Its Committee on Codes of Conduct continues to
do so in response to anonymous queries by sitting judges seeking guidance on the permissibility
of particular conduct by judges and/or judicial personnel. Some, but not all, of the Committee’s
advisory opinions are publicly available “on issues frequently raised or issues of broad
application.” See U.S. Courts: The Federal Judiciary, Published Advisory Opinions,
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/advisoryopinions.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2009). The Committee
can also respond to ethics questions informally, without published opinions.
The Committee’s published advisory opinions are an important resource for understanding
the judicial conduct code, though they are not binding on courts. See, e.g., Draper v. Reynolds,
369 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Court is not bound by the opinions of the
Committee on Judicial Codes of Conduct. In the past, however, courts have considered those
opinions to some extent.”).
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When asked more broadly whether testimony by judges at others’
judicial confirmation hearings (whether positive, negative, or both) is
permissible under the governing conduct code, one judge who had not
testified responded that the Code instructs judges to testify on matters of
judicial administration and that nothing is more critical to judicial
administration than the confirmation of judges. In light of this provision,
this judge concluded that judges should be able to testify at one anothers’
confirmation hearings in conformity with the Code. Another judge who had
testified stated that it was not “even a close question as to whether a judge
can testify regarding judicial nominees because the ABA has asked him
every year since he was appointed” about judicial candidates. This judge
also stated that the judges’ testimony was not character testimony, and that
the prohibition on voluntary character testimony applied only in the trial
context.81
Striking more of a cautionary note, one judge who had testified observed
that the testimony might have approached the line on the Code’s prohibition
on judges’ involvement in political activity when the judges addressed
Alito’s viewpoints on certain issues and expressed opinions more generally
on whether a candidate’s ideology should be taken into account by the
Senate.82
On the specific question of whether Alito, once confirmed to the
Supreme Court, might need to recuse himself from considering cases
participated in by his testifying and/or non-testifying colleagues, several of
the judges (testifiers as well as non-testifiers) declared the issue “bunk” and
“ridiculous.” One judge, who had not testified and who largely opposed
judges testifying at others’ hearings, stated that Senator Leahy’s articulated
concern for Alito’s recusal need was not the real problem with the
testimony. Rather, the real problem, for this judge, was the overtly political
nature of the judges’ panel.

No advisory opinion on the permissibility of this type of testimony has been published on
the Judicial Conference’s website, see U.S. Courts: The Federal Judiciary, Published Advisory
Opinions, http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/advisoryopinions.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2009), but
not all of the Committee’s advisory opinions are made public.
81. See infra Part V.C for a detailed discussion.
82. See Dorf, supra note 4 (noting that Dorf labeled the latter issue an explicitly political
one).
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B. Conduct Code Provisions Arguably Authorizing or Encouraging
Judges’ Testimony at Others’ Article III Confirmation Hearings
Turning specifically to the terms of the relevant conduct code provisions,
Canon 4’s authorization of judges’ legislative and executive branch activity,
including testimony, on matters of judicial expertise, including judicial
administration, provides the strongest argument in support of judges
testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings and was cited by Senator
Specter, Senator Cornyn, and Judge Becker at Alito’s confirmation hearing
as so doing.83 Specifically, Canon 4(A)(2) provides,
A judge may appear at a public hearing before, or otherwise
consult with, an executive or legislative body or official: (a) on
matters concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration
of justice; (b) to the extent that it would generally be perceived
that a judge’s judicial experience provides special expertise in the
area . . . .84

Canon 4’s official Commentary sheds light on the considerations
animating this provision when it observes that a judge, as a “person
specially learned in the law . . . is in a unique position to contribute to the
law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, including revision
of substantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal and
juvenile justice.”85 To the extent time allows and impartiality is not
compromised, “the judge is encouraged to [contribute to the law], either
independently or through a bar association, judicial conference, or other
organization dedicated to the improvement of the law.”86
Though Canon 4(A)(2)’s reference to judges speaking at public hearings
on matters of judicial expertise has come to be understood largely in terms
of testimony on matters of judicial resources, including budget and number
of judgeships, and on matters of civil and criminal procedure and even of
substantive law,87 it is certainly arguable that Canon 4(A)(2) extends to
testimony regarding judicial nominees. Providing guidance on Canon 4’s
authorization to testify is the Judicial Conference Codes of Conduct
Committee’s Advisory Opinion No. 50 (“Opinion 50”). Entitled, “A
83. Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 678–80.
84. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 4(A)(2) (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29,
2008).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Rishikof & Perry, supra note 62, at 683 (inventorying these appearances). As
Perry and Rishikof document, federal judges have testified regularly before Congress on matters
of judicial budget, allocation of judgeships, amendment of procedural rules, and merits of
proposed legislation. Id. at 680–82.
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Judge’s Appearance Before a Legislative or Executive Body or Official,”88
Opinion 50 notes, “[t]he Committee is of the view that under Canon 4 it is
clear that a judge properly may appear before a legislative or executive
body or official, at a public hearing or in private consultation, with respect
to matters concerning the administration of justice.”89 The opinion lists
matters subject to Canon 4 testimony as those “relating to court personnel,
budget, equipment, housing, and procedures,” and notes, “[t]hese are all
vital for the judiciary’s housekeeping functions and for the smooth
operation of the dispensation of justice generally.”90 The opinion continues:
“This much is clear.”91 Whether the opinion provides support for judges
testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings is not so clear. More
specifically, whether the reference to testimony on court personnel
encompasses testimony on the merits of judicial nominees is uncertain,
where the reference has been understood to date as relating to the need for,
and optimal allocation of, judgeships and not the particularities of
individual appointments.
Opinion 50 articulates two conditions that must be satisfied before a
judge can appear before a legislative or executive body. These are: “when
(1) the hearing is public and (2) the subject matter reasonably may be
considered to merit the attention and comment of a judge as a judge, and not
merely as an individual.”92 Given the judges’ testimony’s compliance with
condition (1), the question under Opinion 50 is whether the merits of a
proposed Supreme Court appointment may reasonably be understood as
calling for “the attention and comment of a judge as a judge, and not merely
as an individual,”93 in satisfaction of condition (2).
At the same time, the Committee’s Advisory Opinion No. 93 (“Opinion
93”) cautions against judicial involvement in activity that uses the law to
promote social, political, or civic objectives.94 Observing that “[n]ot every
activity that involves the law or the legal system is considered a Canon 4
activity,” Opinion 93 clarifies:

88. A Judge’s Appearance Before a Legislative or Executive Body or Official, Comm. on
Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. 50 (adopted Aug. 15, 1977; revised Jan. 16, 1998), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/50.html.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Extrajudicial Activities Under Canons 4 and 5, Comm. on Codes of Conduct,
Advisory Op. 93 (adopted Apr. 25, 1997; revised Oct. 27, 1998), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/93.html [hereinafter Extrajudicial Activities Op.].
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[T]o qualify as a Canon 4 activity, the activity must be directed
toward the objective of improving the law, qua law, or improving
the legal system or administration of justice, and not merely
utilizing the law or the legal system as a means to achieve an
underlying social, political, or civic objective.95

Taking Opinions 50 and 93 together, the question under condition (2) of
Opinion 50 becomes whether a judge’s testimony on the merits of a
particular Supreme Court candidate is testimony by a judge qua judge (and
not qua individual) on the law qua law (and not qua politics). Echoing this
formulation, Opinion 93 notes that judicial testimony on matters of law, the
legal system, and the administration of justice have traditionally been
understood narrowly, with two dominant formulations: “[f]irst, we have
described the phrase ‘improve the law’ as ‘being limited to the kinds of
matters a judge, by virtue of [the judge’s] judicial experience, is uniquely
qualified to address.’”96 Second, after ensuring that the testimony is
provided in the judge’s capacity as a judge and not as an individual, “we
look to see if the beneficiary of the activity is the law or legal system
itself.”97
Applying the first formulation to the Third Circuit judges’ Alito hearing
testimony, Judge Becker and his colleagues specifically framed their
testimony as judges, indeed as the nominee’s immediate judicial colleagues,
in establishing their basis of expertise on then-Judge Alito’s fitness for
higher office. Reasonable minds may differ, however, on whether judges’
testimony in this context is on the law qua law or qua politics. There are
certainly ways in which testimony about the merits of a judicial nominee is
testimony about the law, e.g., about the nominee’s understanding of the role
of law and courts in regulating human relations. But, there are also ways in
which testimony on the merits of a judicial nominee is testimony about law
qua politics. Insofar as the testimony relates to the interaction between law
and public policy or is predictive of likely impacts on public policy
outcomes of a particular appointment, it may be understood as relating to
politics.
Applying the second formulation, it is arguable whether the
“beneficiary” of testimony on the merits of a particular nominee is the law
or legal system itself.98 Opinion 93’s examples of appropriate Canon 4
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 293 (LexisNexis
Matthew Bender Publishing 2007) (1990). Jeffrey Shaman helps shed light on the purpose
behind the ABA’s then-parallel Canon 4 authorization of judicial testimony on matters of
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activity are markedly different in kind from judges testifying at others’
judicial confirmation hearings. They include participation in “an
educational videotape to improve the quality of court reporters,”
participation in “a not-for-profit organization to promote the concept of the
resolution of disputes through arbitration,” participation in “an organization
that researches and provides information on the juvenile justice system,”
and so on.99 Under this formulation of the Canon 4 test, it is unclear whether
judges testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings complies with the
Code.
Lastly with regard to Code provisions arguably supporting presentation
of this type of testimony, Canon 2(B)’s official Commentary specifically
allows judges to “respond[] to official inquiries concerning a person being
considered for a judgeship” despite its prohibition on use of prestige of
judicial office to further the judge’s or others’ private interests.100 The
question becomes whether responding to official inquiries “concerning a
person being considered for a judgeship” includes testifying at another’s
judicial confirmation hearing?
In a related fashion, Advisory Opinion No. 59 (“Opinion 59”), subtitled
“Propriety of a Judge Giving Evaluation of Judicial Candidate to Screening
or Appointing Authority,” notes that Canon 2(B) bars a judge from
initiating advocacy on behalf of a friend or acquaintance for judicial
appointment,101 but that, following from the 2(B) Commentary, “there
would be no impropriety in a judge’s answering a proper inquiry from an
appointing officer with respect to the judge’s knowledge concerning the
character and fitness of a candidate for appointment to any public office,
including that of judge.”102 Opinion 59 cautions against “pleading for a
candidate of the judge’s choosing in opposition to others under
consideration” and states that a “judge should not lend his or her name to
any publicity campaign for any candidate.”103 While judges who testify at
judicial expertise, noting, “[t]he exception for bodies concerned with improvement of the law is
necessary in order to allow jurists, who, after all, possess the most experience in administering
the judicial system, to participate in state and national efforts aimed at upgrading the system of
justice.” Id.
99. Extrajudicial Activities Op., supra note 94.
100. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2 cmt. Canon 2(B) (Proposed Revised
Code Feb. 29, 2008).
101. Propriety of a Judge Giving Evaluation of Judicial Candidate to Screening or
Appointing Authority, Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. 59 (adopted April 16, 1979;
revised July 10, 1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/59.html.
102. Id. Similarly, Advisory Opinion No. 59 notes that judges may “respond affirmatively
to requests from or on behalf of the appointing authorities to evaluate candidates insofar as the
judge’s knowledge of the candidates permits.” Id.
103. Id.
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another’s judicial confirmation hearing do not plead the individual
nominee’s candidacy in opposition to other candidates, their testimony is
reasonably understood as lending their names, positions, and reputations to
support (or oppose, as relevant) a particular candidate, as actually happened
at Justice Alito’s and others’ hearings. Additionally, because Supreme
Court confirmation hearings are broadcast live and covered widely in the
media, it is readily anticipatable that judges’ testimony would generate
public attention, even if not self-consciously framed as a publicity
campaign.
C. Conduct Code Provisions Arguably Counseling Against Judges’
Testimony at Others’ Article III Confirmation Hearings
Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges,104 exhorting judges to
uphold the independence and integrity of the judiciary, and its official
Commentary105 make clear the Code’s grounding in concern for preserving
judicial independence and safeguarding the public’s trust and confidence in
the courts. Testimony by judges at others’ judicial confirmation hearings
risks exposing the judiciary to pressures from other entities involved in the
appointments process, thereby raising concern for the perceived and actual
integrity of the judiciary. Judicial testimony also creates at least the
appearance of judges attempting to influence the confirmation process by
using the prestige of judicial office.
Canon 2 exhorts judges, inter alia, to safeguard the actuality and
appearance of propriety.106 The Canon’s official Commentary helps shed
light on this directive by underscoring, as in Canon 1, the importance of
104. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 1 (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29, 2008)
(providing, “[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.
A judge should . . . personally observe those [high] standards [of conduct], so that the integrity
and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.”).
105. Id. Canon 1 cmt. (observing “[d]eference to the judgments and rulings of courts
depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges. . . . Although
judges should be independent, they should comply with the law, as well as the provisions of this
Code. Public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is maintained by the adherence of
each judge to this responsibility. Conversely, violation of this Code diminishes public
confidence in the judiciary and thereby does injury to the system of government under law.”).
106. Id. Canon 2. Canon 2 instructs:
(A) A judge should . . . act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. (B) . . . A judge
should not lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private
interests of the judge or others . . . . A judge should not testify voluntarily as
a character witness.
Id.
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“[p]ublic confidence in the judiciary.”107 The Commentary also makes clear
that “judge[s] must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny.”108
As a result, “judge[s] must . . . accept restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly.”109
Canon 2’s next exhortation to judges, to safeguard the actuality and
appearance of impartiality,110 arguably applies with even greater force than
concern for propriety, where impartiality is central to the public’s
expectations for its judges.111 Judges testifying in favor of or against judicial
colleagues arguably engage in actual partial behavior and certainly risk the
appearance of judicial partiality, i.e., that judges favor (or disfavor in the
case of opposing testimony) particular individuals and even particular
policy outcomes associated with those individuals.
Next, in understanding how Canon 2(B)’s prohibition on use of prestige
of judicial office to further another’s private interests applies to the question
of judges testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings, it is important
to consider whether judicial testimony under these circumstances promotes
a nominee’s private interests (e.g., in career advancement or prestige of
position), or whether such testimony should instead be understood as
relating to matters of overriding public, and not private, interest concerned
with law interpretation and the judicial process. The answer may well be
that judicial testimony under such circumstances involves both. A recent
example of seemingly improper, although not ultimately censured, use of
the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of another
involved Texas Supreme Court Justice Nathan Hecht’s provision of more
than 120 press interviews in support of Harriet Miers’ failed Supreme Court
nomination.112 The Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct recommended
Hecht’s censure for violating Texas’ Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2(B),
paralleling the U.S. judicial conduct code in prohibiting the use of “the
prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or

107. See generally supra note 106; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2 cmt.
Canon 2(A) (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29, 2008).
108. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2 cmt. Canon 2(A) (Proposed Revised
Code Feb. 29, 2008).
109. Id.
110. See id. Canon 2 cmt. Canon 2(A), Canon 2.
111. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 153 (Cambridge
University Press 2007) (observing that “[t]he job of the judge is to render an impartial decision.
Impartiality is the key. It explains the privileged position of judges as expositors of the law.”).
112. See In re Hecht, 213 S.W.3d 547, 554–55 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2006).
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others . . . .”113 The Texas Supreme Court vacated Justice Hecht’s censure
on the ground that Texas’ Canon 2(B) was too vague to serve as the basis
for judicial discipline.114 As a result, there was no final determination on
whether Justice Hecht’s conduct used the prestige of judicial office to
advance a principally private or public interest, if any.115
In addition to its exhortations to propriety and impartiality, and its
prohibition on use of prestige of judicial office to further others’ private
interests, Canon 2(B) prohibits judges from voluntarily testifying as
character witnesses.116 Whether the Third Circuit judges testified voluntarily
at Justice Alito’s hearing in contravention of Canon 2’s prohibition is a
complex question.117 As a matter of official record, the Third Circuit judges
testified in response to formal invitations to do so from the then-Chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee.118 However, all who testify before the Senate
Judiciary Committee receive such letters, and so the letters may not be
decisive of the question of actual voluntariness. Nevertheless, it is clear that
those Third Circuit judges who testified conditioned their willingness to
testify on receipt of formal invitations from the Committee, and Senator
Specter emphasized this point in introducing the panelists at the hearing.119
On this question of voluntariness, the official Commentary to Canon
2(B) instructs judges to discourage being called to testify as character
witnesses.120 There is no evidence of such an effort here. To the contrary,
113. Id. at 553; TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2(B) (2007), available at
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/Judethics/canons.asp#Canon2.
114. In re Hecht, 213 S.W.3d at 575–76.
115. A potentially important factor in the Canon 2 analysis, relating to both its exhortation
to impartiality and prohibition on use of prestige of judicial office to further the judge’s or
others’ private interests, is the Supreme Court’s ruling in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White. 536 U.S. 765, 795–96 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing broad First
Amendment rights for judges in the context of judicial election campaigns). In White, the
Supreme Court framed the question for decision as “[w]hether the First Amendment permits the
Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State from
announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues,” and held that Minnesota’s “no
announce” rule violated the First Amendment as a prior restraint on speech. Id. at 768, 788.
Given the Court’s opinion in White, a prohibition on judges testifying at others’ Senate
confirmation hearings may well be struck down absent a finding that the prohibition is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.
116. TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2(B) (2007), available at
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/Judethics/canons.asp#Canon2.
117. According to Rotunda, this prohibition on voluntary character testimony was not
relevant to the judges’ Alito hearing testimony because the provision has not been applied
outside of the criminal trial context. See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 1370 n.148.
118. See Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 653.
119. Id.
120. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2 cmt. Canon 2(B) (Proposed Revised
Code Feb. 29, 2008) (providing that “[e]xcept in unusual circumstances where the demands of
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we know that Judge Becker played a central role in organizing the panel
testimony.121
Turning to the question of whether the judges provided character or fact
testimony at the Alito hearing, where the prohibition is on voluntary
character testimony, the answer is that they provided both. The judges’
testimony included many statements about Alito’s temperament, integrity,
and humility that contained both factual and character elements.122 Other
statements were simply factual in nature, as when the judges observed that
Alito had never raised his voice in post-argument conferences and that Alito
had refused to have a reception held in honor of his tenth anniversary on the
bench.123 Still other statements constituted clear character, or opinion,
testimony as when Judge Becker asserted that Alito was not a “movement
person” and was not an “ideologue.”124
In determining whether the judges’ testimony was primarily factual or
character in nature, it might be useful to consider what relevant facts a judge
might address at another judge’s elevation hearing. In Courts and Congress,
Katzmann suggests that there might be a role for a chief district judge to
provide his or her views when formally solicited by a congressional
committee about whether a district judge nominated for elevation to the
court of appeals was up-to-date with his or her docket.125 Substituting
“circuit” for “district” in Katzmann’s hypothetical, none of the current or
former Third Circuit judges who testified at the Alito hearing and who had
served as chief judges while Alito was on the bench (Judges Scirica,
Becker, and Aldisert) addressed in their Senate testimony whether Alito had
been up-to-date with assigned opinions and other case dispositions.126
Moreover, there is no need for judicial colleagues to testify to this type of
factual information because the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
(“AO”) maintains official data on case dispositions.127 Rather than call a
chief judge to provide his or her understanding of an elevation candidate’s
justice require, a judge should discourage a party from requiring the judge to testify as a
character witness”). The ABA’s annotated guide to its then-parallel model judicial conduct code
noted one of the motivations for the prohibition on voluntary character testimony as being a call
from judges for protection from such requests. See, e.g., E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES
TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 49 (1973).
121. See Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 653.
122. Id. at 654–56 (Third Circuit Judge Becker describing Alito’s judicial temperament,
integrity, intellect, and approach to law).
123. Id. at 654–55.
124. Id. at 655.
125. KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 95–96.
126. See Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 654–61.
127. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/ao/services.htm (last
visited Nov. 2, 2008).
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case management record, the Senate Judiciary Committee could instead
examine AO data. Indeed, submission of a set of AO data for the period of a
nominee’s judicial service could become standard practice for Senate
consideration of sitting judges nominated for elevation, obviating any need
for judges to testify about these types of factual matters at others’
confirmation hearings.128
A last consideration on this question of judges volunteering character
testimony concerns the Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of
Conduct’s Advisory Opinion No. 9, which provides that, if judges present
character testimony, then the number of judges testifying should be
limited.129 Insofar as the Alito hearing testimony represented an
unprecedented expansion in the number of judges testifying, the panel
appeared to have tried to demonstrate strength in numbers in support of
Alito’s confirmation, rather than limiting their presence.
With final regard to conduct code provisions arguably counseling against
testimony by judges at others’ confirmation hearings, Canon 7 instructs
judges to refrain from political activity, providing, inter alia, “[a] judge
should not . . . publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for public office” and
“[a] judge should not engage in any other political activity.”130 Canon 5
contains an important caveat for purposes of this article: that its prohibition
on judicial involvement in political activity “should not prevent a judge
from engaging in the activities described in Canon 4,”131 which authorizes
128. Returning to the fact versus character question, Katzmann distinguished the situation
of a chief district judge called upon by a congressional committee or Senator to evaluate a
sitting district court judge nominated for elevation from a non-chief judge called upon to
provide his or her views on “the fitness of a particular judicial nominee” (analogous to the
testimony at the Alito hearing). See KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 95. Here, Katzmann
observed, “the situation is different in that a chief judge would have relevant views about such
factual, objective matters as to whether the prospective nominee disposes of his or her cases in a
timely manner.” Id. at 96. Katzmann distinguished the chief district court judge situation yet
further by hypothesizing a “circumstance . . . in which a sitting judge initiates contact with a
senator or congressional committee to offer views about a prospective candidate.” Id. There,
Katzmann observed, “the considerations arguing against such input are magnified, particularly
the risk that the judge will be perceived as attempting to influence the legislature.” Id.
Katzmann cautioned, “The possibility of legislative backlash underscores the danger of such a
step. Prudence would suggest that if a judge is to provide views about a nominee, then it should
be done, if at all, at the request of legislators.” Id.
129. Judge Testifying as a Character Witness, Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op.
9
(adopted
Jan.
21,
1970;
revised
Jan.
16,
1998),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/09.html (observing, “to the extent that the trial court has
discretion to limit character evidence generally the trial judge should consider limiting the
number of judges appearing in such a role”).
130. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 7(A) (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29,
2008).
131. Id. Canon 5(C).
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judges to testify before legislative and executive branch bodies on matters
of judicial expertise, including judicial administration.132
Because Supreme Court confirmation hearings are highly politicized,
testimony by judges at these hearings risks injecting the judges into political
activity and casting the judiciary in an overtly political role. This in turn
risks undermining public trust and confidence in the courts and respect for
the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judicial process.133
D. Conclusions as to the Testimony’s Permissibility Under the Judicial
Conduct Code
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the Code of Conduct for U.S.
Judges does not directly address the permissibility of sitting judges
testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings. While Canon 4’s
authorization of judicial testimony on matters of judicial expertise and
Canon 2(B)’s Commentary’s authorization of judges’ responses to official
inquiries concerning individual judicial candidates arguably support such
testimony, consideration of the larger principles animating the judicial
conduct code––impartiality,134 independence, and non-involvement in
political activity––appear to counsel against it.
E. Must Judicial Elevation Candidates, Such as Alito, Recuse Themselves,
if Confirmed, from Reviewing Cases Participated in by Their Testifying
and/or Non-testifying Colleagues?
A Supreme Court candidate’s need to recuse him or herself from
considering cases in which his or her testifying (and/or non-testifying)
colleagues participated below is not the, or even a, central question in
evaluating the wisdom and propriety of judges testifying at others’ judicial
132. Id. Canon 5(B).
133. As Morrison observed in his essay on judges and politics:
[I]t is hard to imagine a more political activity than the confirmation of a
Supreme Court justice. There is no pretense that competence, integrity, and
judicial temperament are all that matter, nor is there any doubt that presidents
do take political considerations into account and that the Senate does also.
This fact alone should be enough to preclude federal judges from testifying at
confirmation hearings . . . .
Morrison, supra note 5, at 297.
134. W. Bradley Wendel, Abstract, Jurisprudence and Judicial Ethics (Cornell Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
08-009,
2007),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024316 (observing that “[t]he fundamental
value in judicial ethics is impartiality”).
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confirmation hearings. Indeed, it is a bit of a red herring, given the more
pressing questions for judicial independence and judicial ethics effects
raised by the testimony. Nevertheless, the question of recusal need is
addressed briefly here because it was raised by Senators, academics, and
other commentators at the time of the Alito hearing.135 More specific
questions include whether recusal is triggered only by testimony offered in
favor of confirmation? Against confirmation?136 Only by the case
participation of testifying judges? Non-testifying judges?
As it happened, Justice Alito recused himself from considering what
appears to be all Third Circuit cases coming before the Supreme Court for
review (at both the petition for certiorari and merits stages) for more than
one year following his confirmation to the Court, though he did not state his
reason(s) for recusal.137 It may well be that Justice Alito recused himself
from consideration of his former court’s matters as a result of the Third
Circuit’s practice of circulating and pre-filing all published opinions to all
active judges for review.138 Because every active Third Circuit judge

135. See Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 644–52; see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RECUSAL:
ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144, at 1 (2002),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Recusal.pdf/$file/Recusal.pdf.
For
excellent
treatments of judicial recusal standards, see generally Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances:
A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531 (2005) and Arthur
D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics in the Federal System: A Peek Behind Closed
Doors, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 189 (2007).
136. Chief Justice Rehnquist recused himself for several years from considering cases
involving James Brosnahan of Morrison & Foerster, who had testified against Rehnquist at his
elevation hearing. See Mauro, supra note 57, at 13.
137. I found 162 instances in which Justice Alito had taken “no part in the consideration or
decision” of a case from the Third Circuit, including petitions for certiorari, petitions for
rehearing from denial of certiorari, and decisions on the merits (LEXIS search last performed on
Mar. 7, 2008). The Third Circuit cases from which Justice Alito has recused himself in the
Supreme Court included some in which he had served on the appellate panel, such as Beard v.
Banks, in which then-Judge Alito had authored a dissent. 548 U.S. 521, 524 (2006). Most of the
Third Circuit cases from which Justice Alito recused himself did not involve his participation at
the appellate level. See, e.g., Wadley v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1894 (2007) (denying petition
for certiorari with respect to unpublished opinion authored by Judge Smith and joined by Judges
Barry and Rodriguez).
While some of the Third Circuit cases from which Justice Alito has recused himself
involved one or more of his testifying colleagues, see, e.g., id. (considering unpublished opinion
authored by Judge Smith and joined by Judges Barry and Rodriguez), the majority of the Third
Circuit cases from which Justice Alito has recused himself did not involve his testifying
colleagues. See, e.g., Vazquez v. Ragonese, 127 S. Ct. 1213 (2007) (denying petition for
certiorari with respect to unpublished opinion by Judge Rendell and joined by Judges Fisher and
Van Antwerpen).
138. See 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. § 5.5.4 (2002), available at
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf.

1222

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

reviews every published opinion pre-filing,139 every active judge may be
considered to have participated in the decision. That then would serve as a
basis for recusal, as detailed in the discussion below.140
The two most recently confirmed justices prior to Alito, Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Breyer, had also recused themselves from consideration
of cases, at both the certiorari and merits stages, arising from their former
courts of appeals (the District of Columbia and First circuits,
respectively).141 This is so even though none of their colleagues had testified
at their confirmation hearings.142 What is not known is whether their
recusals were prompted by parallel opinion-circulation practices in their
circuits, or whether their recusals suggest a Supreme Court custom, though
not rule, against involvement in a case that was on one’s lower court’s
docket while serving as a lower court judge.
Looking to the federal law governing judicial recusal,143 a judge’s need
to recuse him or herself from consideration of a case arises either from (a)
concern for the appearance or actuality of partiality,144 or from (b) specific
grounds including personal knowledge of the facts of a case, or familial or
financial involvement in the case.145 More specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”146 Section 455 was
amended years ago to substitute an objective test for the previously
subjective test, where the question for decision now is whether a judge’s
participation would be apparently improper because apparently partial.147 A

139. See id.
140. I found a number of instances in which Chief Justice Roberts had taken “no part in the
consideration or decision” of a case from the D.C. Circuit, including decisions on petitions for
certiorari, on petitions for rehearing from denial of certiorari, and on the merits (LEXIS search
last performed on Mar. 7, 2008). Looking to the last Justice confirmed before Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Breyer recused himself from consideration of First Circuit cases at both the
certiorari and merits stages. See, e.g., United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 516 U.S.
1140 (1996).
141. See, e.g., id. (Breyer recusing himself from ruling on petition of certiorari from First
Circuit).
142. See infra app. A.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2001). Section 455 applies to Supreme Court Justices and lower
court judges. Id. § 455(a). See generally Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations
of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1887–90 (1988) (discussing
interpretation and application of judicial recusal standards).
144. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
145. Id. § 455(b).
146. Id. § 455(a).
147. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, The Threat to Judicial Independence by Criticism of
Judges––A Proposed Solution to the Real Problem, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729, 740–41 (1997).
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Supreme Court Justice’s need to recuse is left for decision to the individual
Justice and is not reviewed by his or her colleagues.148
Justice Alito’s decision to recuse himself from considering all Third
Circuit matters coming before the Court was not unreasonable, where his
impartiality “might reasonably be questioned”149 with regard to published
decisions he had reviewed pre-filing as a result of the Third Circuit’s
opinion-circulation practice, or with regard to cases in which his lower
court colleagues had participated, whether testifiers or non-testifiers. On
this latter point, Steven Lubet incorrectly distinguished at the time of the
Alito hearing between “[a] justice’s anger at someone who testifies against
him” and “a judge’s gratitude toward someone who testifies for him,”150
where either circumstance could give rise to reasonable questions of
partiality.
I conclude then where I began: that recusal is not the main issue, nor
even one of the more important issues, arising when federal judges testify at
others’ judicial confirmation hearings. I turn instead to recommendations
for the future. Specifically, are there other more desirable mechanisms for
judges to share with appointing officials their impressions of colleagues
who are candidates for elevation?

148. See Hellman, supra note 135, at 203 n.87 (quoting Justice Rehnquist in Hanrahan v.
Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301 (1980), noting, “generally the Court as an institution leaves
[disqualification] motions, even though they be addressed to it, to the decision of the individual
Justices to whom they refer”).
A particular concern with recusal at the Supreme Court level, highlighted by Justice Alito’s
written response to Senator Feingold’s recusal inquiry at the hearing, is that it results in an eightperson court, with the possibility of a four-four tie, leading to affirmance of the lower court
judgment. Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 791. Alito’s written response observed, inter alia:
Supreme Court Justices have less latitude to err on the side of recusal,
because recusal can lead to decisions that are evenly divided or that involve
less than an absolute majority of the Court. Lack of a definitive resolution to
a case when the litigants have no higher court that could resolve their cases
undermines the judicial process.
Id. Justice Alito concluded by noting:
Based on what I know at this time, I do not think that the testimony of the
court of appeals judges should require me to recuse myself in cases on which
they sat, but if confirmed, I would undertake a thorough review of the past
practices of Justices in any analogous situations, and if a recusal motion is
filed in a case on which one or more of the testifying judges sat, I would
carefully consider the arguments presented.
Id.
149. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
150. Mauro, supra note 57, at 13 (quoting Lubet as observing that “[a] justice’s anger at
someone who testifies against him is more palpable than a judge’s gratitude toward someone
who testifies for him. They are not symmetrical.”).
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VI. ARE THERE OTHER MORE DESIRABLE MECHANISMS FOR JUDGES TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE ARTICLE III APPOINTMENTS PROCESS?
I return to one of the central findings of my interviews—that most of the
judges with whom I spoke thought judges could provide appointment
officials with unique insights into judicial colleagues’ temperaments and
character.151 With this in mind, I wanted to explore whether there are other
ways besides live testimony for judges to share their impressions of, and
experiences with, judicial colleagues who are being considered for
elevation, and to reflect on whether these other mechanisms avoid the
judicial independence and ethics concerns presented by live testimony. I
look first to the two current (and historic) mechanisms of judicial
involvement noted in the Introduction—behind-the-scenes consultations
with Senators and participation in confidential ABA interviews.152 I then
turn to other suggested mechanisms of judicial involvement153 and to
comparative perspectives on judges’ roles in judicial appointments
processes for state, federal, national, and international courts.154
A. Judges’ Historic Involvement in Article III Appointments Processes
Through Means Other than Presenting Live Testimony
Henry Abraham and other scholars have documented the active role
played by some judges, including Supreme Court Justices, in suggesting
names of prospective judicial candidates to appointment officials, including
the President, and lobbying for particular candidates since at least the early
part of the twentieth century.155 Chief Justice Warren Burger, for example,
was notoriously active in lobbying the President and other appointing
officials for Supreme Court and circuit court candidates, as were Chief
Justice William Howard Taft and Justice Abe Fortas.156
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See infra app. B.
See supra Part I; infra Part VI.A.
See infra Part VI.B.
See infra Part VI.C.
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 25 (Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, 5th ed. 2008) (1974).
156. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 21–22 (Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 4th ed. 1999) (1974); see DAVID J. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
IS APPOINTED 54–55 (Random House 1964) (1963) (recounting Justice Taft’s lobbying for
Justice Pierce Butler’s appointment); GERHARDT, supra note 56, at 194–95 (highlighting Justice
Frankfurter’s lobbying of President Roosevelt for Judge Learned Hand’s Supreme Court
appointment); DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 87–88 (W. W. Norton & Company 2005) (1986); see also DAVID A. YALOF, PURSUIT
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This behind-the-scenes consultation between judges and executive and
legislative branch appointments officials continues into the present, initiated
in some instances by judges and in others by other branch officials.157 These
consultations raise many of the same concerns as live testimony for judicial
independence effects (both institutional and individual), integrity,
impartiality, use of prestige of judicial office to promote others’ private
interests, and judicial involvement in political activity. Beyond that, behindthe-scenes consultations lack transparency and are “virtually impossible to
monitor and control.”158 As Gerhardt has observed, “informal consultation
could represent the opposite of the democratization of the process by
reflecting the degree to which decision makers are captive to or consult only
with a relatively small elite.”159 Gerhardt goes so far as to consider whether
there should be a law prohibiting legislative or executive branch
consultation by judges on judicial appointments, but concludes that such a
law “would be difficult to enforce,” noting “[f]ederal judges might find
ways around it by sending signals by indirect, difficult-to-detect means.”160
As for the second means of ongoing judicial involvement in the judicial
appointments process—participation in confidential interviews with ABA
representatives investigating judicial candidates, the ABA has spoken with
judges (as well as lawyers, litigants, and others) about the merits of actual
and prospective judicial nominees since 1956.161 Established early in the
Eisenhower administration, the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary played a central role in the investigation and evaluation of federal
judicial candidates through the end of the Clinton presidency.162 President
George W. Bush ended the practice of forwarding names of prospective
nominees to the ABA Standing Committee pre-nomination soon after he
entered office,163 and the ABA currently initiates its investigation after
public announcement of a nomination. Relevant information gleaned from
the ABA’s confidential interviews is reported to the Senate on an
anonymous basis.164 The confidentiality and anonymity of the ABA

OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 11–12,

123, 138 (1999).
157. ABRAHAM, supra note 155, at 18–19.
158. GERHARDT, supra note 56, at 231–32.
159. Id. at 232.
160. Id. at 233.
161. See O’BRIEN, supra note 3, at 84–85.
162. See id. at 85; GERHARDT, supra note 56, at 141.
163. LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS 74 (2005).
164. ABA STANDING COMM., supra note 47, at 3.

1226

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

investigatory process is thought to encourage judges and others to be more
candid in their assessments of nominees.165
In the case of Alito’s nomination to be Associate Justice,
the Standing Committee . . . interviewed more than 300 people
from all Federal circuits who knew, had worked with, or had
substantial knowledge of the nominee. Of that number over 130
were Federal judges, including all members of the Supreme Court
of the United States [and] members of the United States Courts of
Appeals . . . .”166

As this example makes clear, ABA interviews with judges constitute a
significant form of judicial involvement in the Article III appointments
process.
The ABA’s evaluation process has not been without its critics. Concerns
have been raised, for example, for the potential for bias and/or mistaken
understandings affecting confidential interview statements. Because
interview comments are reported anonymously, if at all, candidates and
appointment officials are handicapped in their ability to respond to negative
comments. As a result, the ABA interviews also raise transparency
concerns. It was with these concerns in mind that Michael Dorf questioned,
“[i]f that information can enter the process indirectly, what’s wrong with
airing it directly?”167 In other words, “What’s the big deal with the live
testimony?”
Indeed, judges’ live confirmation hearing testimonies contain at least two
elements that offer the promise of greater transparency of judicial input and
protection against unchecked communication of bias and/or misinformation
than do either of the longstanding mechanisms of judicial involvement.
First, the open format of the live testimony appears to provide some
measure of accountability for judge-witnesses’ statements. A conundrum
arises, however, in that the very public nature of the sitting judges’
testimony is a significant part of what is most concerning about the
testimony from a judicial independence and ethics perspective. The
testimony’s very openness raises concerns for negative impacts on public
trust and confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the courts. The
public nature of the testimony likewise raises concerns for the use of
165. Id. The ABA then rates each nominee as “well qualified,” “qualified,” or “not
qualified” in a report submitted both orally and in writing to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Id.
at 8–9.
166. Letter from Stephen L. Tober, Chair, ABA Standing Comm. on Fed. Judiciary, to the
Honorable Arlen Specter, Chair, S. Comm. on the Judiciary 3 (Jan. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/SCpage/Alito-letter.pdf.
167. Dorf, supra note 4.
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prestige of judicial office to promote others’ private interests and for
judges’ involvement in overt political activity. The answer to this
conundrum should not, of course, be to hide this type of judicial influence,
but, rather, to engage in an open examination of its desirability.
Second, live questioning of judge-witnesses by Senate committee
members offers at least the promise of direct follow-up, whether the
testimony is negative or positive in nature. That said, I question whether the
judges’ hearing testimony offers a truly meaningful opportunity for followup. Despite the judges’ emphasis on live Senate questioning as one of the
testimony’s central benefits akin to cross-examination at trial, a number of
those with whom I spoke made clear that as soon as Senate questioning
becomes probing, judge-witnesses would, and likely should, resist
answering on the grounds of confidentiality of the judicial process or from
concern for other judicial independence harms. Thus, if a Committee
member were to question a judge-witness about something that transpired at
a post-argument conference, or having to do with the substance of a judge’s
vote on a particular case, or on how two or more judges came to agree on a
particular passage or holding in an opinion, the judge-witness would, and
likely should, invoke confidentiality and/or respect for institutional comity
and refuse to answer. This dynamic already exists with respect to nominees’
testimony, and it is this “prevarication” and “non-responsiveness” that have
prompted Benjamin Wittes, and others, to call for an end to nominee
testimony.168 The same dynamic exists for confirmation hearing testimony
by a nominee’s judicial colleague.
Given concerns for the lack of transparency of the two historic means of
judicial involvement in judicial appointments and for the various concerns
raised by judges’ live testimony, I turn to suggestions of other possible
means of participation by judges in Article III appointments.
B. Other Means of Involvement by Judges in Judicial Appointments?
Are there other mechanisms for involving judges in Article III
appointments that avoid the concerns identified with existing processes?
One judge with whom I spoke proposed several ways of trying to preserve
some of the value of live testimony while avoiding some of the testimony’s
potential impacts on judicial independence and judicial ethics. First, he
suggested having the nominee’s colleagues testify in the Senate
confirmation hearing’s closed session, instituted after Clarence Thomas’
confirmation hearing as a forum for airing sensitive matters related to ethics
168. WITTES, supra note 1, at 118–28.
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and personal finances.169 Alternatively, he proposed taking oral testimony
from the nominee’s immediate judicial colleagues and reporting it to the
Senate Judiciary Committee without attribution, noting that this might
better preserve the dignity of the judiciary by avoiding the appearance of
partiality and/or political involvement potentially at stake in the Alito
hearing. This judge acknowledged that such an approach would sacrifice the
live testimony’s directness of exchange between judge-witnesses and
Senate committee members, thought by many of the judges with whom I
spoke to be one of the principal benefits of the judges’ testimony. Third, he
suggested having the ABA Standing Committee representatives field
questions from the Senate Judiciary Committee on the substance of their
interviews with the nominee’s judicial colleagues when they present their
report to the Committee in open session. None of these proposals works,
however, where the third raises hearsay-like concerns and may well impact
the candor with which the ABA interviews are conducted, while the first
and second fail to address concerns for the transparency of the testimony.
Another alternative suggested to me was to establish a standing body of
judges within the federal judiciary to conduct investigations of other judges
nominated for elevation, with findings reported to judicial appointments
officials in the executive and legislative branches. This proposal is akin to,
though different from, the operation of judicial appointments commissions
in other systems and presents many of the same judicial independence and
ethics concerns raised by the live testimony, including potential for
partiality and political involvement by judges.170 Yet another alternative
suggested to me was to allow only former federal judges to testify at
judicial elevation hearings. While this proposal avoids judicial conduct code
concerns insofar as the Code does not apply to former judges, testimony by
former judges still has the potential to shape public perceptions of judges’
partiality, political involvement, and use of judicial office to benefit others.
Moreover, as with testimony by sitting judges, former judges’ testimony
risks rendering unduly vulnerable to Senate and public scrutiny the
necessarily confidential realm of judicial decision making.
In rejecting various alternative proposals for judicial involvement in
Article III appointments, I am mindful that judges are actively involved in
the selection of judges in other judicial systems, at the state, federal,
national, and international levels. What follows are highlights of judges’

169. The idea for a closed door session at judicial confirmation hearings was originally
published by Lloyd N. Cutler in Why Not Executive Sessions?, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1991, at
A23. A closed session is presently held for all Supreme Court nominees.
170. See infra Part VI.D.
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roles in a sampling of other appointments systems, developed more fully in
a separate article.171
C. Comparative Perspectives on Judges’ Roles in Other Judicial
Appointments Systems
Participation in and/or leadership by judges is a common element of
judicial appointments systems at the state, national, and international levels,
and is likewise relied on for non-Article III federal appointment of
magistrate and bankruptcy judges. Looking first to state court systems
within the United States, approximately twenty, or two-fifths, of the states
include judges on judicial nominating commissions, with more than half of
these states naming the chief justice of their supreme court as chair or
member of the state’s nominating commission.172 In most of these states, the
nominating commissions forward names of three to five prospective judicial
candidates to the governor for appointment.173
Turning to non-Article III federal judicial appointments, Congress has
provided for district court judges to appoint U.S. magistrate judges174 and
circuit judges to select U.S. bankruptcy judges.175 Per statutory provision,
district courts are to use merit selection panels in vetting candidates for
magistrate judgeships, with final appointment decisions resting with the
district judges in each district.176 Bankruptcy judges are selected by the
circuit judges of the regional courts of appeal, and there is no statutory
requirement of use of merit selection panels to identify qualified
candidates.177 Magistrate and bankruptcy judges serve for fixed, renewable
terms (of eight and fourteen years, respectively) and are reviewed by district
171. Clark, supra note 1.
172. LARRY C. BERKSON & RACHEL CAUFILED, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT FOR THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 2–3 (2004), available at
http://www.ajs.org /selection/docs/Berkson.pdf.
173. Id. Judges appointed through this system typically serve for an initial two-year term
before facing a public retention election.
174. Resnik, supra note 1, at 605–06 (noting that “through enactments in 1968 and in 1984,
Congress created these new categories of what I term statutory judges and stipulated their
method of selection and their terms of office. Article III judges at the trial level, district by
district, appoint magistrate judges who serve for eight-year renewable terms. The number of
magistrate slots is decided by the Judicial Conference of the United States . . . as long as it can
allocate funds to pay for their judgeships.”)
175. Id. at 606 (observing that “[t]he twelve appellate courts that govern geographicallydelineated circuits have the power to appoint bankruptcy judges, who serve for fourteen-year
renewable terms. Congress has retained its power to decide directly the number of such
judgeships . . . .”).
176. Id. at 607.
177. Id.

1230

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

and appellate court judges for purposes of reappointment. In light of these
selection and reappointment processes, and given district and circuit court
judges’ power to review judgments of magistrate and bankruptcy judges,
respectively, commentators have raised concern for the meaningful
decisional independence of magistrate and bankruptcy judges.178
As for other countries’ judicial appointments processes, a not
insignificant number rely exclusively or in large part on judges to select
other judges.179 Great Britain, for example, recently revised its high court
appointment process to locate authority to recommend justices for its new
Supreme Court in a five-person commission chaired by the President of the
Supreme Court (its chief justice).180 Other members of the commission
include the Deputy President of the Supreme Court (its most senior
associate justice) and one member each from the Judicial Appointments
Commission for England and Wales, the Judicial Appointments Board for
Scotland, and the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission.181
Lower court judges in England and Wales are recommended by a different
judicial appointments commission, which includes judges as well as
lawyers and laypersons.182

178. See id. at 607–10.
179. For an excellent recent source on other countries’ judicial appointment systems, see
ALAN PATERSON ET AL., APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Kate Malleson and Peter Russell eds., 2006). For
other outstanding sources, see generally CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, THE POWER
OF JUDGES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY (C.A. Thomas ed., 2002) and
John Bell, Judicial Appointments: Some European Experiences (Oct. 4, 2003) (unpublished
paper from the Conference on “Judicial Reform: Function, Appointment and Structure” held by
the
Centre
for
Public
Law,
University
of
Cambridge),
available
at
http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/docs/view.php?doc=865.
180. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ACT, 2005, app. 1, pt. 3, § 21 (Eng.), at 10, available at
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldconst/83/83.pdf
[hereinafter CRA]. Pursuant to the CRA, the final appellate review authority exercised by the
Appellate Committee of the Law Lords of the House of Lords is to be transferred to a newly
established Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, to be composed of the former Law Lords,
known as “Justices.” Id. app. 1, pt. 3, § 20, at 9–10. The Supreme Court will begin operating in
October 2009. Id. app. 1, Commencement, at 7.
181. Id. app. 1, pt. 3, § 21, at 10. Note that the last three listed individuals on the Supreme
Court appointments commission (from the new regional judicial appointments commissions)
may or may not be judges. Id. The CRA and related consultation papers specify that the
Commission must consult with judges familiar with the selectee’s work as a lower court judge
and that when the Lord Chancellor receives the commission’s report, he must consult with all
judges consulted by the commission itself along with other senior judges of the British courts
and other officials of Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.
182. See id. app. 1, pt. 4, § 31, at 12; see also Kate Malleson, The New Judicial
Appointments Commission in England and Wales: New Wine in New Bottles?, in APPOINTING
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 179, at 48–49.
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In Israel, a nine-member judicial selection committee composed of
professional and political representatives names judges to the general
courts, peace courts, and Supreme Court.183 The five professional members
of the commission include three Supreme Court justices and two members
of the bar.184
In strictly civil law systems,185 judges play an even more central role in
judicial selection. In France, for example, judicial candidates are recruited
directly out of the National Judges College.186 The Supreme Judicial
Council (Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature, “CSM”), composed of
judges, prosecutors, and laypersons, proposes candidates for the “ordinary
judiciary,” including the Supreme Court of Appeals (Cour de Cassation)
and the principal trial and appellate courts.187 The President of the Republic
formally appoints candidates recommended by the CSM.188 The CSM must
also give periodic “advice,” or evaluations, of lower court judges.189
A survey of selection methods for international court judges reveals a
wide variety of approaches used,190 including some reliance on judges to
propose judicial candidates. The ICJ, for example, recommends that
member states confer with their high court justices, among other officials, in
nominating candidates for election by participating states.191 Most
international courts are silent on how states-members should nominate
judicial candidates. In response to concern for lack of guidance on judicial
nomination procedures, a report on the judicial appointments process for the
183. Judges Law, 5713–1953, LSI 124 (Isr.).
184. Eli M. Salzberger, Judicial Appointments and Promotions in Israel: Constitution, Law,
and Politics, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 179, at 248–49.
185. Reference to “strictly” civil law systems is intended to distinguish the Israeli legal
system from the civil law systems in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere, where Israeli law
reflects a hybrid of common law and civil law traditions. The latter is seen most prominently in
Israel’s codification of contract and tort law.
186. See Bell, supra note 179, at 7–8; see also Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature,
Recrutement sur concours (2007), available at http://www.enm.justice.fr//devenirmagistrat/recrutement-concours.php.
187. See Bell, supra note 179, at 7–8; see also Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature,
Recrutement hors concours, available at http://www.enm.justice.fr//devenir-magistrat/sansconcours.php.
188. See Bell, supra note 179, at 7–8; see also Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature, Devenir
Magistrat (2007), available at http://www.enm.justice.fr//devenir-magistrat/accueil.php.
189. See Bell, supra note 179, at 7–8.
190. The discussion here includes, but is not limited to, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the International Criminal Court (ICC),
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
191. Ruth MacKenzie & Phillipe Sands, Judicial Selection for International Courts:
Towards Common Principles and Practices, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL
POWER, supra note 179, at 220.
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ECHR recommended, inter alia, “the establishment of independent bodies
at the national level to nominate candidates . . . .”192 The ECHR also
recently amended its rules to provide for a longer non-renewable term of
judicial service to minimize incentives for judges to decide cases so as to
promote their re-election prospects.193
Lastly, of particular relevance to this article’s focus on judges’ testimony
at other judicial candidates’ confirmation hearings, none of the systems
highlighted here involve legislative branch confirmation hearings. As a
result, the particular concerns involved in judges testifying at others’
hearings are not presented.
D. Some Reflections on Merits of Judges’ Roles in Other Judicial
Appointment Systems
Reflecting on the comparative merits of sitting judges’ roles in other
judicial appointments systems and focusing specifically on the relatively
common practice of judges serving on, even chairing, judicial nominating
commissions, some of the advantages of that practice include: judges know
what the “job” of judging entails and can effectively evaluate judicial
candidates from that vantage point; judges on the commission may have
first-person experience of the nominee’s judicial temperament, character,
and work ethic from working together in practice and/or on the bench;
participation by judges gives the judiciary greater control over its own
“staffing;” and successful judges can “reproduce” themselves by recruiting
similarly skilled colleagues for the bench. There are also some compelling
disadvantages, including: judicial involvement in judicial selection is less
democratic, or democracy-reinforcing, than participation by members of the
public and publicly accountable elected officials; judges can dominate the
opinions and/or votes of non-judges on judicial nominating commissions,
thereby undermining the diversity of views expressed, considered one of the
central benefits of the nominating commission model; judges do not
necessarily know what is most desirable in a judicial candidate because the
public, and not fellow judges, are the consumers of judges’ work and have
valuable ideas about what makes a good judge; lower court judges could be
motivated to curry favor for promotion with judges known or anticipated to
be on the judicial nominating commission, with potential effects on judicial
reasoning and outcomes; judges picking other judges presents the potential
for “stacking the deck” ideologically; potential for public perception of the
192. Id. at 229.
193. See id. at 223.
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partiality and/or political involvement by judges; and actual potential for
judges’ injection into partisan politics.
VII.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Mindful of other approaches to the question of judicial participation in
other judicial appointments systems and of their comparative advantages
and disadvantages, this article nevertheless concludes that federal judges
should not testify at others’ Article III confirmation hearings. The U.S.
Constitution reserves the power to nominate and confirm judges to the
executive and legislative branches. No official role or power is granted to
the judiciary regarding judicial appointments, and none shall be assumed.
Judges threaten judicial independence and judicial ethics principles when
they exercise power in the Article III appointments realm. It is not so much
a question of judges usurping the Senate’s domain when they testify,
especially where the Senate has invited their testimony, but, rather, a
question of judges inappropriately assisting the Senate in its constitutional
advise and consent function. Concern for inappropriate judicial role, along
with concern for actual and perceived partiality, overt political involvement,
and use of prestige of office by judges to benefit others, counsel against
judges testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings, where, on
balance, the testimony presents more concerns than benefits for the wellbeing of individual judges, the judiciary, and the three branch system.
Greater thought should instead be given to whether members of the bar,
other professional colleagues, members of civic organizations, and other
non-judges can present useful testimony on the nominee’s judicial
temperament and qualifications for office and thereby avoid the judicial
independence and judicial ethics concerns associated with judges’
participation in the Article III appointments process.194 The Senate could
learn much, for example, about a nominee’s possession of the attributes
Abraham argues Supreme Court justices should hold, including
“demonstrated judicial temperament” and “professional expertise and
competence,” by hearing from lawyers and litigants who have appeared
before the nominee, as well as bar association representatives, other civic
leaders, and legal academics familiar with the nominee.195 With so many
194. Here, I echo KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 95–96.
195. ABRAHAM, supra note 155, at 2. These attributes are: “One, demonstrated judicial
temperament. Two, professional expertise and competence. Three, absolute personal as well as
professional integrity. Four, an able, agile, lucid mind. Five, appropriate professional
educational background or training. Six, the ability to communicate clearly, both orally and in
writing, especially the latter.” Id. (citation omitted).
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non-judges available to testify, and with their testimony avoiding concerns
for judicial independence and judicial ethics effects, the Senate should
desist from calling sitting judges to testify at others’ Article III confirmation
hearings, and judges should resist any such calls.
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APPENDIX A

History of Federal Judges’ Testimony at Others’ Supreme Court
Confirmation Hearings√
A complete listing of testimony by current and former federal judges at
others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings is as follows:
Clement Haynsworth to be Associate Justice (1969)
Testimony by:
Judge Harrison Winter of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit;
and Former Judge Lawrence Walsh of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, and then-current Chair, ABA Standing
‡
Committee on the Federal Judiciary.
William Rehnquist to be Associate Justice (1971)
Testimony by Judge Walter Craig of the U.S. District Court for Arizona
in support.
William Rehnquist to be Chief Justice (1986)
Testimony by former Judge Griffin Bell of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, and former Attorney General, in support.∗
√
In addition to presenting live testimony, current and former judges have also submitted
letters and written statements to the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of individual
Supreme Court nominees. See, e.g., Letter from the Hon. Tom Clark, former U.S. Supreme
Court Justice, to the Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 20, 1970); Nomination of Harry A.
Blackmun of Minn. to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 28 (Apr. 29, 1970) (supporting the
confirmation of Judge Harry Blackmun to be Associate Justice).
∗
As the above list reveals, Griffin Bell has testified in support of the nominee at four
Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Bell’s status as a former Attorney General who oversaw
judicial appointments in the Carter administration (along with the White House Counsel) was of
greater relevance to his appearance at these hearings than his status as a former federal judge.
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Robert Bork to be Associate Justice (1987)
Testimony by:
Retired Chief Justice Warren Burger of the U.S. Supreme Court in
support;
Former Judge Griffin Bell of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, and former Attorney General, in support;
Former Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, and former Secretary of Education, in opposition;
and former Judge Harold Tyler of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, and then-current Chair, ABA Standing
‡
Committee on the Federal Judiciary.
Anthony Kennedy to be Associate Justice (1987)
Former Judge Harold Tyler of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, and then-current Chair, ABA Standing Committee on
‡
the Federal Judiciary.
David Souter to be Associate Justice (1990)
Testimony by former Judge Griffin Bell of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, and former Attorney General, in support.
Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice (1991)
Testimony by:
Former Judge Griffin Bell of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, and former Attorney General, in support;
Former Judge John Gibbons of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in support; and
‡
Note that former Judge Lawrence Walsh and former Judge Harold Tyler each
testified specifically as the then-current Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary, and not in their capacities as former federal judges.
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Judge Jack Tanner of the U.S. District Court for Washington in support.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice (1993)
Former Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, and former Secretary of Education, in support.
John Roberts to be Chief Justice (2005)
Testimony by former Judge Nathaniel Jones of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, raising concerns about the nominee’s civil
rights record.+
Samuel Alito to be Associate Justice (2006)
Testimony by seven current and former judges of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in support.

+
Judge Jones’s testimony is identified here as “raising concerns about” Roberts’s
candidacy, rather than “opposing” it because nowhere in Judge Jones’s testimony did he directly
state his opposition to Roberts’s confirmation. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on
Nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Justice, S. Hrg. 109-158, at 466–67 (2005). Judge Jones
introduced his testimony by stating that he was speaking on behalf of a number of civil rights
“greats” to raise concerns about Roberts’s civil rights record. Id.

1238

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

APPENDIX B

Interview Methodology
I mailed three rounds of letters to active and senior Third Circuit judges
serving at the time of the Alito hearing, asking the judges to contact me if
they were interested in speaking about the question of judges testifying at
others’ confirmation hearings. I contacted nineteen judges in total. Judge
Becker died in May 2006 as I began work on this project, and so I did not
have an opportunity to speak with him about the testimony.
The first round of letters was sent to all judges on July 5, 2006. The
second round of letters was sent to those I had not yet heard from on August
15, 2006. The third, and final, round of letters was sent to those I still had
not heard from as of September 25, 2006. I also wrote to the two former
judges who had testified at Justice Alito’s hearing with the same request
noted above.
I received responses from fourteen judges. Ten granted interviews, on
which I took contemporaneous notes from which I draw their interview
comments here. The judges with whom I spoke have reviewed this article in
draft form to confirm the accuracy of the interview comments attributed to
them. These judges included slightly more non-testifying than testifying
judges and more judges who supported the practice than were critical of it.
The four who declined to be interviewed did not state a reason for their
declining and included both those who had testified and those who had not.
I interviewed eight of the judges by telephone and two in person. All of
the interviews were conducted between July and October, 2006. The
interviews were relatively brief, typically running 25 to 35 minutes, with the
two in-person interviews lasting longer than that.
As noted earlier, where most, but not all, of the judges with whom I
spoke made their comments for attribution, I do not identify any of them by
name so as not to reveal the identities of those who did not speak for
attribution. Moreover, I refer to all of my interview subjects as “judge” so
as not to identify whether a current or former judge made the particular
comment and as “he” so as not to identify the judge’s sex. I do note whether
the judges whose comments I highlight had testified or not, where that
factor may well be important in evaluating their comments.
At the same time that I contacted the judges, I also mailed letters seeking
interviews to Senators Arlen Specter and Patrick Leahy as then-Chair and
ranking minority member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. I received
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several responses from Senator Specter’s office indicating interest in an
interview, though one did not ultimately result. I did not receive a response
from Senator Leahy’s office.

